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I. Introduction
In April 2012, forty percent of Israel's natural gas supply was
cut off almost instantly.' After months of supply interruptions and
allegations of self-dealing on the part of Egyptians in forging a
natural gas deal with the Israeli government,2 the Egyptian
government reneged on its agreement to supply Israel with natural
gas to meet its energy needs.3 Nearly overnight, Israel was left to
figure out how to supply almost half of its energy needs.
In 2010, the United States Geological Survey (USGS)
estimated that the Levant Basin in the eastern Mediterranean Sea
holds approximately 1.7 billion barrels of recoverable oil and 122
trillion cubic feet (cf) of recoverable gas.4 Since the discovery of
these reserves, countries bordering the Levant Basin, including
Israel and Lebanon, have laid a claim to those resources and have
begun a publicity battle to gain international support for the
exploration and development of oil and gas in the eastern
Mediterranean.' It is no surprise that Israel and Lebanon have
I Megan O'Sullivan, Israel's Undersea Gas Bonanza May Spur Mideastern
Strife, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (May 12, 2012), http://www.cfr.org/israel/
israels-undersea-gas-bonanza-may-spur-mideastem-strife/p28449.
2 See Egypt Scraps Israel Gas Supply Deal, BBC NEWS (Apr. 23, 2012, 5:33
AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 17808954.
3 Id.
4 See U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY: ASSESSMENT OF UNDISCOVERED OIL AND GAS
RESOURCES OF THE LEVANT BASIN PROVINCE, EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN 1 (2010),
available at http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS 10-3014.pdf.
5 See Landau Says Israel Willing to Use Force to Protect Gas Finds Off Coast,
BLOOMBERG (June 24, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-24/landau-says-
israel-willing-to-use-force-to-protect-gas-finds-off-coast.html; see also Verbal War Over
Gas Escalates Between Lebanon, Israel, YA LIBNAN (June 25, 2010, 12:34 AM),
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claimed part of the resources as their own: experts claim that the
natural gas reserves are the largest offshore reserves discovered in
the last decade and by far the largest reserves discovered in the
Mediterranean.6 For these neighboring states, both of which rely
on energy imports to meet energy consumption demands, this
reserve of natural gas has the potential to address long-running
energy security-and national security-concerns.
The Israeli government rushed to run a string of buoys into the
Mediterranean originating at its northern coastal border with
Lebanon.! The Lebanese claim that this string of buoys is "angled
too far northward," effectively cutting off Lebanon's access to the
reserves.9 Unsurprisingly, both countries claim that the other has
infringed its maritime boundaries.' Lebanon and Israel have yet
to establish maritime boundaries under any existing international
agreement."
Given the absence of a diplomatic relationship between
Lebanon and Israel, 2 the economic and political instability of the
region,13 and the potential value of the yet undeveloped energy
http://www.yalibnan.com/2010/06/25/verbal-war-over-gas-escalates-between-lebanon-
israel/.
6 See Tobias Buck, Field of Dreams: Israel's Natural Gas, FIN. TIMES MAG.
(Aug. 31, 2012, 7:26 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/1dbda574-fl6d-llel-a553-
00144feabdcO.html#axzz2Hcx5DyzY.
7 See id.
8 See What a Gas! Israel's New Gas Finds May Affect Its Strategic Friendships
Too, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 11, 2010, at 57, available at http://www.economist.com/
node/I 7468208 [hereinafter What a Gas!]; Nicholas Blanford, Coveting Thy Neighbor's
Shores: Israel and Lebanon Border Conflict Shifts to Sea, AL BAWABA (July 26, 2011,
9:20 AM), http://www.albawaba.com/coveting-thy-neighbors-shores-israel-and-lebanon-
border-conflict-shifts-sea-385466.
9 What a Gas!, supra note 8, at 57.
10 See id.
11 See Martin Wthlisch, Israel-Lebanon Offshore Oil & Gas Dispute-Rules of
International Maritime Law, AMER. Soc. OF INT'L L., Dec. 5, 2011, at 2, available at
http://www.asil.org/sites/default/files/insightll205.pdf.
12 Id. (noting that Israel and Lebanon do not enjoy diplomatic relations and, after
decades of conflict, remain formally at war). For a more thorough discussion of the
Israel-Lebanon conflict, see infra Part II.
13 Both Israel and Lebanon rely on oil and gas imports to meet energy demands,
and in a region rife with conflict, sources for oil and natural gas are unreliable at best.
For a more detailed discussion of the political and economic situation in these two
countries, see infra Part II.
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resources, existing international law frameworks 4 must be used to
mediate between the countries and divide access to the reserves
equitably.'" It is imperative that Israel and Lebanon jointly submit
this dispute to a formal dispute resolution tribunal or mediator in
order to resolve this increasingly contentious maritime border
dispute, rather than leaving the state of the unresolved border
ambiguous, which could devolve into military conflict. Successful
resolution of the Lebanon-Israel maritime boundaries in the
eastern Mediterranean is essential for the economic, political, and
environmental viability of the region.
This Comment will elucidate and critically evaluate the
options for resolving the Israel-Lebanon maritime boundary
dispute in the eastern Mediterranean as those boundaries affect the
exploration and development of existing natural gas reserves in the
Levant basin. Part I will provide a brief history of the relationship
between Israel and Lebanon and an analysis of the economic and
political impact of natural gas exploration in the region.16 Part II
will provide an overview of the United Nations Convention on
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).17 Lebanon is a signatory to UNCLOS
and Israel is not;'" however, UNCLOS is the only international
convention that provides internationally accepted standards for
drawing maritime boundaries.' 9  Part III will discuss recent
14 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Part I, Dec. 10, 1982, 1833
U.N.T.S. 397 [hereinafter UNCLOS].
15 See Press Conference by United Nations Special Coordinator for Lebanon on
Security Council Resolution 1701 (2006), UNITED NATIONS (July 21, 2011),
http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2011/110721 _Lebanon.doc.htm [hereinafter
Press Conf. U.N. Lebanon].
16 See infra Part I.
17 See infra Part II.
18 See Table Recapitulating the Status of the Convention and of the Related
Agreements, as at 18 September 2013, U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFF. AND THE LAW OF THE
SEA (Sept. 18, 2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference-files/status20l0.pdf
[hereinafter Status of the Convention].
19 See generally UNCLOS, supra note 14, pmbl. ("Developments since the United
Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea held at Geneva in 1958 and 1960 have
accentuated the need for a new and generally acceptable Convention on the law of the
sea"); Julia Lisztwan, Note, Stability of Maritime Boundary Agreements, 37 YALE J.
INT'L. L. 153, 156 (2012) (observing that "UNCLOS is a formidable attempt to provide a
comprehensive regime for management of the oceans" that "interacts with the larger
body of international law, including the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties").
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diplomatic agreements reached regarding the drawing of maritime
boundaries between Lebanon and Cyprus in 2007 and Israel and
Cyprus in 2010, and discuss the ongoing dispute over oil and
natural gas in the Arctic.20 Part IV will outline and evaluate five
alternative options to settle this maritime boundary dispute,
including available remedies under the UNCLOS, at the
International Court of Justice (ICJ), and through mediation by the
United Nations, and arbitration. 2 1 This Comment will conclude
with a brief commentary on the viability of these options and what
the international community can expect moving forward.2 2
II. Setting the Stage: The Political and Economic Context for
Natural Gas and Oil Exploration in the Levant Basin"
Israel and Lebanon have never enjoyed good diplomatic
relations and have been involved in multiple military conflicts
with each other since the 1940s.24 While outside the scope of this
Comment, the bilateral conflict between the countries must also be
viewed with an eye toward conflict throughout the region.2 5 Much
of the conflict between the countries has centered on the
demarcation of the terrestrial border, often referred to as the Blue
Line.2 6 While the Blue Line has been largely demarcated, the
maritime boundary dispute has just begun.
20 See infra Part III.
21 See infra Part IV.
22 See infra Conclusion.
23 Volumes have been written on the history of the Middle East, and by no means
does this Comment intend to provide a comprehensive history of the region. Instead,
what follows is a brief discussion of the history of the relations between Israel and
Lebanon and the political and economic forces currently at play, all of which provide a
context for the current dispute over maritime borders.
24 See, e.g., Lebanon Profile, BBC NEWS (Oct. 24, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-14649284 (outlining Lebanon's history
since 1516 and noting multiple points in time in which Israel and Lebanon have been in
direct conflict).
25 Some scholars argue that the bilateral conflict between Israel and Lebanon can
be viewed as a proxy for Israel's conflict with Syria and Iran, both of which have
supported Hezbollah in one way or another. See generally CASEY ADDIS, CONG.
RESEARCH SERV., R40054, LEBANON: BACKGROUND AND U.S. RELATIONS 2 (Feb. 1,
2011).
26 See CASEY ADDIS & CHRISTOPHER BLANCHARD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
R41446, HEZBOLLAH: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 28 n.77 (Jan. 3, 2011).
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Map of Levant Basin Province 27
WN
A. History of the Israel-Lebanon Conflict
A basic understanding of the complex history of Israel-
Lebanon relations is essential to understanding the context of and
evaluating the viable solutions to the current maritime boundaries
dispute. These bordering countries have been involved in almost
continuous conflict since Israel's founding in 1948, highlighted by
multiple military conflicts, kidnappings, assassinations, and the
27 Map of Levant Basin Province, Eastern Mediterranean, U.S. GEOLOGICAL
SURVEY (Jan. 30, 2013), http://gallery.usgs.gov/photos/04_07 2010 hlc5FRqllY 04
07 2010 0.
932 Vol. XXXIX
NATURAL GAS AND THE LEVANT BASIN
loss of many innocent lives. 28
The State of Israel was established following intense
negotiations between the United States and the British
governments, a study conducted by the U.N. Special Commission
on Palestine, and over the objections of Arab states, including
Lebanon, Jordan, and Syria.29  The United Nations adopted
Resolution 18130 (also known as the Partition Resolution), which
divided Palestine--once claimed by the United Kingdom-into
Jewish and Arab states in 1948.31 The Arab states strongly
objected to the agreement and, following the announcement of the
establishment of the state of Israel, joined forces and fought a war
with the newly established nation.3 2 Tensions in the region were
later exacerbated by the Arab-Israeli war in 1967, during which
time the Israeli government "gained control over the Sinai
Peninsula, the Golan Heights, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and
East Jerusalem."3 3  The geographical boundaries established
following the 1967 war have remained a point of controversy in
the region and are a central focus in ongoing peace talks. 34 The
Arab-Israeli wars and other military conflicts since 1948 reflect
the violent history between Israel and its neighbors.
Lebanon, to Israel's north, was occupied by multiple empires
and settled by the French as a Christian enclave in a
predominantly Muslim region.3 ' The independent state of
Lebanon was established after claiming independence from France
in 1943, just a few years before the founding of the state of
28 See Lebanon Profile, supra note 24.
29 See Creation of Israel, 1948, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/creation-israel [hereinafter Creation of
Israel].
30 Partition Resolution, G.A. Res. 181 (11), at 131, U.N. Doc. A/RES/181(II) (Nov.
29, 1947).
31 Creation oflsrael, supra note 29.
32 The Arab-Israeli War of 1948 lasted less than a year and resulted in armistice
agreements with all of Israel's neighbors. Arab-Israeli War of 1948, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN, http://history.state.gov/milestones/1945-1952/
ArablsraeliWar.
33 Arab-Israeli War of 1967, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE HISTORIAN,
http://history.state.gov/milestones/1 961-1968/ArablsraeliWar67.
34 See, e.g., Swapping Gaza for the West Bank?, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Apr.
1, 2005), http://www.cfr.org/world/swapping-gaza-west-bank/p7983.
35 See Lebanon Profile, supra note 24.
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Israel.36 The French left an indelible mark on the culture and
politics of Lebanon, including Lebanon's notability as one of the
only Middle Eastern countries with a sizable Christian population
and Christian participation in government.37
During the 1950s, Lebanon enjoyed relative political and
economic stability.38 However, political tensions began to rise as
regional influences strengthened, internal migration from rural
areas of Lebanon to Beirut continued, and politics and religion
became further intertwined.3 9 Lebanon endured a long and bloody
civil war between 1975 and 1990, which finally ended with the
signing of the Ta'if Agreement.4 0 In short, the Agreement
equalized the ratio of Christians to Muslims in Parliament, called
for fully ending the Israeli and Syrian occupation of Lebanon, and
provided for the disbandment of private militias. 41 Lebanon's
36 See id.
37 See Alexandra Harrington, Resurrection from Babel: The Cultural, Political,
and Legal Status of Christian Communities in Lebanon and Syria and Their Prospect for
the Future, 13 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L. 217, 221-30 (2006).
38 Hassan Krayem, Lebanese Civil War and the Taif Agreement, AMERICAN
UNIVERSITY OF BEIRUT, http://ddc.aub.edu.1b/projects/pspa/conflict-resolution.html
("The Lebanese system enjoyed relative stability and an impressive average rate of
economic growth during the 1950s and most of the 1960s.").
39 In 1975 the Lebanese civil war was set off when Phalangist (Christian) gunmen
attacked a bus in Beirut, killing twenty-seven, mostly Palestinian, passengers. Lebanon
Profile, supra note 24. By the time of the Lebanese civil war, Syria, Lebanon's neighbor
to the north, was a prominent participant in the country's military landscape. Id.
Additionally, a significant population of Palestinians displaced from the Arab-Israeli war
remained in the country and allied themselves with the leftist political parties and the
Lebanese National Movement. See Krayem, supra note 38; Lebanon Profile, supra note
24.
40 See Krayem, supra note 38.
41 The Ta'if Agreement, Nov. 4, 1989, available at http://www.un.int/wcm/
webdav/site/lebanon/shared/documents/Constitution/The%20Taif/o20Agreement%20(E
nglish%20Version)%20.pdf ("Until the Chamber of Deputies passes an election law free
of sectarian restriction, the parliamentary seats shall be divided . . . [e]qually between
Christians and Muslims."). The political power sharing agreement has not necessarily
aligned with the religious affiliation of Lebanon's citizens. See generally Bernard
Gwertzman, Hezbollah: Most Powerful Political Movement in Lebanon, COuNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (May 29, 2008), http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-most-powerful-
political-movement-lebanon/pl6378?breadcrumb=%2F (interviewing Daniel L. Byman,
Professor at Georgetown University and Research Director of the Saban Center at the
Brookings Institution). For instance, it is estimated that Shiite Muslims make up
approximately forty percent of the population of Lebanon. Id. Nevertheless, Muslims-
including Sunnis and Shiites-account for only fifty percent of the positions in
NATURAL GAS AND THE LEVANT BASIN
political system has been largely characterized as a "confessional
system," which guarantees parliamentary representation for each
of the nation's religious "confessions," or groups, and sets aside
certain government positions for various political and religious
groups.4 2 Under the current system, the president of Lebanon is a
Maronite Christian, the Speaker of Parliament a Shi'a Muslim, and
the prime minister a Sunni Muslim. 43
A discussion of Israel-Lebanon relations over the last thirty
years is incomplete without mention of Hezbollah. Hezbollah,
which translates to "Party of God" in Arabic, 44 made its first
distinctive mark in the region in 1983, when the group was blamed
for suicide attacks at the U.S. marine barracks in Beirut, claiming
the lives of 240 U.S. soldiers. 45  The organization is a political
party, social welfare organization, and Shiite Islamist militia group
based in southern Lebanon.4 6 The U.S. Department of State
considers it a terrorist organization. 7 It was founded in southern
Lebanon, a region historically ignored by the Lebanese
government, which left room for anti-Israeli groups to assert their
influence. 48  Hezbollah filled the void left by the Lebanese
government and established its stronghold in the south following
the expulsion of the Palestinian Liberation Organization in 1982.'9
Parliament. Id. The 1932 census was used as the basis for the political power sharing
system and, since that time, religious populations have shifted. Id.
42 See NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, FINAL REPORT ON THE LEBANESE
PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION 9 (2009), available at http://www.ndi.org/files/Lebanese
Elections_Report 2009.pdf.
4 3 Id.
44 Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr., Foreword to HIZBALLAH: TERRORISM, NATIONAL
LIBERATION, OR MENACE?, at iii (2002).
45 Thomas E. Donilon, Hezbollah Unmasked, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 17, 2013),
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/18/opinion/hezbollah-unmasked.html. For an in-depth
history of the establishment and activities of the organization, including details of the
1983 attack, and an overview of the organization's relationships with Iran and Syria, see
generally Times Topics: Hezbollah, N.Y. TIMES, http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
reference/timestopics/organizations/h/hezbollah/index.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2013).
46 ADDIS & BLANCHARD, supra note 26, at 1.
47 Id
48 See Michael N. Schmitt, "Change Direction" 2006: Israeli Operations in
Lebanon and the International Law of Self-Defense, 29 MICH. J. INT'L L. 127, 130
(2008).
49 See id.; John Kifner, Hezbollah Leads Work to Rebuild, Gaining Stature, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 16, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/16/world/middleeast/
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The organization's goals include the "liberation of Jerusalem, the
destruction of Israel, and the establishment of an Islamic State in
Lebanon."o It is well financed and supported by the Iranian and
Syrian governments." Beyond its military objectives, Hezbollah
has been active in providing humanitarian aid and social services
to southern Lebanon52 and is a major political force." In fact, it
has been labeled the "most powerful single political movement in
Lebanon."54 Since 2008, there has been little debate over whether
this is true." After the organization took over West Beirut and
pushed the country to the brink of another civil war, Lebanon's
Cabinet granted it effective veto power in exchange for drawing
down its troops across the city.5 6
Between 1982 and 2000, Israel occupied southern Lebanon."
The U.N. Security Council engaged in the withdrawal effort by
adopting Resolutions 4255' and 426 5 in 1978 and 1981,
respectively.60 It was not until 2000 that Israel ended its
16hezbollah.html (noting that "'Hezbollah's strength' . . . in large part derives from 'the
gross vacuum left by the state."').
50 Schmitt, supra note 48, at 131.
51 Id
52 For example, Hezbollah has provided local residents with funds to cover
medical and other essential services that the government of Lebanon has been unable to
provide. See Sabrina Taverinse, Charity Wins Deep Loyalty for Hezbollah, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 6, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/06/world/middleeast/06tyre.html?
pagewanted=all.
53 Gwertzman, supra note 41.
54 Id.
55 See Jonathan Masters, Hezbollah (a.k.a. Hizollah, Hizbu'llah), COUNCIL ON
FOREIGN REL. (July 15, 2010), http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-
hizbullah/p9l55.
56 Id. The 2008 outbreak in violence was sparked when the Lebanese government
announced a move to shut down the telecommunications network of the organization.
Id. The conflict escalated and resulted in the Doha Accords, which ended the political
showdown. Id
57 See Lebanon Profile, supra note 24 (providing a detailed timeline of key events
in Lebanese history, including the Israeli invasion of southern Lebanon in June 1982).
58 S.C. Res. 425, U.N. Doc. S/RES/425 (Mar. 19, 1978).
59 S.C. Res. 426, U.N. Doc. S/RES/426 (Mar. 19, 1978).
60 Schmitt, supra note 48, at 130; S.C. Res. 426, supra note 59, 1 2; S.C. Res. 425,
supra note 58, T 3. These resolutions also established the United Nations Interim Force
in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to "monitor the withdrawal, help restore international peace and
security, and assist Lebanon in establishing effective authority in the area." Schmitt,
936
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occupation of southern Lebanon in compliance with Resolution
425.61 The border along Lebanon's southern border and Israel's
northern border has been referred to as the "Blue Line" since
then.6 2 Hezbollah, angered by what it viewed as an incomplete
withdrawal effort63 and backed by the Syrian government, filled
the "security vacuum" following the withdrawal, mounting attacks
on Israeli targets, including Israeli civilians. 4 The assassination of
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri in 2005 escalated anti-
and pro-Syrian tensions within Lebanon, setting the stage for
Hezbollah to demonstrate its ability to wield power in the
country.65 The ensuing "Cedar Revolution" ushered in an anti-
Syrian government and temporarily weakened Hezbollah's
political standing as a supporter of Syria's presence in the
country.66  In response, Hezbollah and pro-Syrian protestors took
to the streets across Lebanon and Hezbollah and walked out on the
National Assembly when it voted to pursue a case against Prime
Minister Hariri's assassin. 67  The prime minister was forced to
supra note 48, at 130.
61 Schmitt, supra note 48, at 131. The occupation of Sheeba Farms (also spelled
Shib'a Farms) is an ongoing controversy between Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. JEREMY
M. SHARP ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33566, LEBANON: THE ISRAFL-HAMAS-
HEZBOLLAH CONFLICT 8-10 (2006). The United States and Israel regard the area as
Israeli-occupied Syrian territory, but Syria and Lebanon insist that the territory rightly
belongs to Lebanon. See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 131-32. Hezbollah uses Israel's
continued occupation of Sheeba Farms as a justification for remaining armed. SHARP ET
AL., supra note 61, at 8.
62 The "Blue Line" refers to the United Nations-determined border between Israel
and Lebanon as of the Israeli withdrawal in 2001, but is not the internationally
recognized border between the countries. See ADDIS & BLANCHARD, supra note 26, at
28, n. 77.
63 See SHARP ET AL., supra note 61, at 5.
64 See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 132. Israel and the Security Council implored the
Lebanese government to take action to prevent further attacks, but their requests fell on
deaf ears; then-President Emile Lahoud did little to temper the increasing violence. Id.
At the time, Syria was exerting a great degree of control over the political situation. See
id. Under that country's influence, President Lahoud's reign was extended for an
additional term. See id.
65 See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 133.
66 See id. The Cedar Revolution ushered in an anti-Syrian coalition government in
Lebanon in 2005. SHARP ET AL., supra note 61, at 2. Syria was allegedly involved in
Prime Minister Hariri's assassination, though no formal charges have been brought
against anyone involved in the assassination. Id. at 17.
67 Schmitt, supra note 48, at 133.
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make significant concessions to Hezbollah to keep a fragile
political coalition-and the potential for peace-intact.6 8 This
political play by Hezbollah is a significant example of the power
of the organization within the Lebanese government and the
organization's status as a symbol of national sovereignty.
In August 2006, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
1701,69 which called for the cessation of attacks by both Hezbollah
and Israel.70  Shortly after the adoption of Resolution 1701, the
countries agreed to a ceasefire." Since the adoption of Resolution
1701, military skirmishes largely have ended, though the countries
remain officially at war.72 The Security Council's resolution also
increased the size and mandate of the United Nations Interim
Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) to monitor the ceasefire, support
humanitarian effort, and restore peace in the area once again.73
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 425 and 426, which were
passed in 1978 and 1981, respectively, prior to Israel's first
withdrawal from southern Lebanon, created UNIFIL.7 4 UNIFIL
was created to monitor Israel's initial withdrawal from southern
Lebanon, help restore security and peace in the region, assist
Lebanon in securing its southern region, and monitor the Blue
Line.7' Neither the Lebanese government nor UNIFIL forces-
68 Id. Arguably, Prime Minister Siniora's most significant concession at this time
was to agree not to refer to Hezbollah as a "militia" but rather as a "resistance group,"
effectively shielding Hezbollah from U.N. Resolution 1559, which called for the
disarmament of militia in the country. Id.
69 S.C. Res. 1701, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1701 (Aug. 11, 2006).
70 See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 135; S.C. Res. 1701, supra note 69, 11.
71 See Schmitt, supra note 48, at 135.
72 See Lebanon Profile, supra note 24.
73 See S.C. Res 1701, supra note 69, 1 11. See also Rami G. Khori, A Polarized
Middle East Will Remain Volatile for Years to Come, WOODROW WILSON
INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, MIDDLE EAST PROGRAM OCCASIONAL PAPER
SERIES 7 (Fall 2006), available at http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/
ramikhouril.pdf.
74 S.C. Res. 426, supra note 59, 1 2; S.C. Res 425, supra note 58, 1 3; UNIFIL
Mandate, U.N. INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON, http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.
aspx?tabid=1 1553&language=en-US. Both Israel and Lebanon were heavily involved in
the negotiation over the scope and mandate of UNIFIL. See Efrat Elron, Israel, UNIFIL
II, the UN, and the International Community, 13 PALESTINE-ISRAEL J. OF POLITICS,
ECON., AND CULTURE, no. 4, 2007, at 32-33, http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=973.
75 See UNFIL Mandate, supra note 74; Mary E. Stonaker, Massive Energy
Discoveries Complicate Relations Between Israel and Lebanon, AL ARABIYA (June 24,
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reinforced with troops from France, Italy, and other European
nations-made any immediate efforts to disarm Hezbollah in
2006, claiming that Hezbollah had cooperated with the Lebanese
government.16  UNIFIL's mandate addresses only the territorial
border between Israel and Lebanon and does not provide for
monitoring any established maritime border between the
countries." Resolution 1701 did expand the mandate of UNIFIL
to include a Maritime Task Force (MTF), however, the MTF is
tasked only with monitoring territorial waters, "securing the
coastline," and "preventing the unauthorized entry of arms" into
Lebanon. 8 UNIFIL has been largely successful at securing the
border and ensuring relative peace along the Blue Line since
2006.79
Today, Lebanon and Israel remain at odds and do not enjoy a
diplomatic relationship. This historical tension has only escalated
since the discovery of natural gas and oil in the eastern
Mediterranean in 2010, and the tension between the countries will
influence the prospects for a resolution to their maritime boundary
dispute.so In July 2011, the U.N. Special Coordinator for Lebanon
put it this way: "major issues-including the existence of arms
outside State control, [the] use [of arms] as a political instrument
and Israel's presence . .. must be tackled in order for Lebanon to
2011, 4:23 PM), http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/24/154627.html. UNIFIL
partners with the Lebanese Armed Forces to monitor the border. UNIFIL Mandate,
supra note 74. It is also important to note that UNIFIL played an important strategic role
by allowing Israel to withdraw from southern Lebanon without appearing to concede to
its adversary, Hezbollah. See William K. Mooney, Stabilizing Lebanon: Peacekeeping
or Nation-Building, 37 PARAMETERS, U.S. ARMY WAR COLL. Q., no. 3, Autumn 2007, at
28-29 (outlining the expanded mandate of UNIFIL after the 2006 war).
76 See Kifner, supra note 49. While Israel was involved in the negotiation over the
mandate of UNFIL under Resolution 1701, Israel's attitude toward UNIFIL is not
entirely positive. See Elron, supra note 74 (pointing to Israel's criticism that UNIFIL is
negotiating with Hezbollah rather than the Lebanese Armed Forces, as required by its
mandate).
77 See UNFIL Mandate, supra note 74.
78 See UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, U.N. INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON,
http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=l 1584&language=en-US.
79 This is evident from the low number of border conflicts and skirmishes with
Israeli, Lebanese, and Hezbollah forces along the border. See generally Lebanon Profile,
supra note 24.
80 See Press Conf. U.N. Lebanon, supra note 15.
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exercise full sovereignty over its territory.
B. Current Political & Economic Situation: Lebanon
Lebanon's history has been rife with turmoil, periods of unrest,
and political instability. Leading up to the Lebanese civil war,
Lebanon was considered the "most stable democracy in the Arab
World."82 The political situation since the signing of the Ta'if
Agreement in 1989 has been unstable and the Agreement itself has
yet to be fully implemented." With the assassination of Prime
Minister Rafik al-Hariri in 2005, Lebanon devolved into political
conflict again. 4 The 2009 elections were the first democratic
elections in post-war Lebanon to be held in one day, and the
election resulted in a new parliament, speaker of parliament, and
prime minister.15  The government under the leadership of Prime
Minister Najib Makati and President Michel Sulayman has taken
steps to ready the country for oil and natural gas exploration off its
coast, including appointing a committee to review the maritime
border.8 6  Parliamentary elections were originally scheduled for
June 2013;87 the election has since been postponed to November
2014."
Just as Lebanon's political system has experienced nearly
constant disruptions, so too has its economy. The country carries
81 Id.
82 Krayem, supra note 38.
83 See Karam Karam, The Taif Agreement: New Order, Old Framework, in
RECONCILIATION, REFORM AND RESILIENCE: POSITIVE PEACE FOR LEBANON 36 (2012),
available at http://www.c-r.org/sites/c-r.org/files/Accord24_TheTaifAgreement.pdf.
84 Patrick Seale, Who Killed Rafik Hariri?, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2005),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/feb/23/syria.comment.
85 See NAT'L DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTE, supra note 42, at 1-2.
86 Cabinet to Review Maritime Boundaries, THE DAILY STAR LEBANON (Aug. 25,
2012), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Aug-25/185642-cabinet-to-
review-maritime-boundaries.ashx#axzz2HmTljiPV.
87 See Lebanese Electoral Assistance Project (LEAP) for the 2013 Parliamentary
Elections, U.N. DEV. PROGRAMME, LEBANON, http://www.undp.org.lb/ProjectFactSheet/
projectDetail.cftn?projectld=203.
88 See Raya Jalabi, Lebanon's Government to Postpone Elections Until November
2014, THE GUARDIAN (May 31, 2013), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
may/31/lebanon-elections-postponed-2014 (noting that the 17-month postponement is
the "first time in parliament has lengthened its mandate since Lebanon's 1975-1990 civil
war" and citing the difficulties in negotiating a new electoral law).
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almost $50 billion in national debt.8 9 Foreign direct investment in
the country is limited because of continued political instability,
corruption, high tariffs and taxes, and bureaucratic uncertainty. 90
Significant physical infrastructure damage resulted from the civil
war, forcing the country to borrow from allies to fund the effort to
rebuild.9' This effort has been largely responsible for driving up
national debt and limiting economic growth in the country.92
Public debt now constitutes 128 percent of the nation's GDP, the
sixth highest debt-to-GDP ratio in the world.93
Like Israel, Lebanon is a net-importer of oil and natural gas.
Lebanon's oil and natural gas consumption needs are met almost
entirely by imports.9 4 Lebanon has relied on Syria, its neighbor to
the east and north, to help meet its energy demands." The country
has long relied on imports of oil, but in recent years has started to
transition to natural gas.9 6 The country's Energy and Water
Minister estimates the transition will save the country $1 billion
and "[enhance] energy supply security." 97 The Lebanese cabinet is
very aware of the potential value of the natural gas resources, and
it has taken multiple steps to establish its maritime border in the
eastern Mediterranean.98
Given the political and economic situation in Lebanon, and the
conversion of its power plants from oil to natural gas, the potential
for Lebanon to move toward a balanced production-consumption
89 See Stonaker, supra note 75.
90 See Lebanon, Economy-Overview, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html (select
"Lebanon" from the dropdown menu in the upper right hand portion of the page, and
then select "Economy" to display the overview).
9I See id.
92 Id
93 Id
94 See Lebanon, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN. (May 30, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfn?fips=LE.
95 See Stonaker supra note 75.
96 See id.
97 Transition to Natural Gas Conserves Billions in Lebanon, THE DAILY STAR
LEBANON (Apr. 29, 2012), http://www.albawaba.com/business/lebanese-natural-gas-
422892.
98 See Cabinet to Review Maritime Boundaries, supra note 86. See also infra Part
III.
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scale is real, and a matter of pressing urgency.99 Tensions between
Israel and Lebanon are already high.' 0 While the prospect of
developing natural gas off their coasts holds enormous potential
for both countries, Iran's involvement in Lebanon's development
of the resources will undoubtedly escalate tensions between Israel
and Lebanon.'
C. Current Political & Economic Situation: Israel
In January 2013, Benjamin Netanyahu was elected to his third
term as Israel's prime minister. 0 2 Netanyahu has been a staunch
and vocal advocate of Israel's exploration of the natural gas
reserves in the Levant Basin, vowing to defend the offshore gas
fields in furthering Israel's "strategic objectives" since the reserves
were discovered in 2010.103 His strong stance has only
hardened.'0 4 In August 2011, Netanyahu's government took the
extreme measure of ordering the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) to
dispatch drones to protect the offshore natural gas fields from
threats by Lebanon and Hezbollah leaders.'0o The IDF was to
maintain twenty-four hour surveillance over the disputed area.'0o
Israel's assertive stance and military action make sense given
what the country stands to gain if the reserves are explored and
developed. Israel produces approximately 55 billion cubic feet of
99 See id.
100 See What a Gas!, supra note 8.
101 See generally id. (discussing the geopolitical dynamics in the region in light of
the natural resource discovery); see also Blanford, supra note 8.
102 Jodi Rudoren, Netanyahu Gets Lukewarm Vote for Third Term, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/23/world/middleeast/israel-votes-in-
election-likely-to-retain-netanyahu.html (noting that Netanyahu served as prime minister
1996 to 1999, and started his second term in 2009). See also Times Topics: Benjamin
Netanyahu, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/
timestopics/people/n/benjamin netanyahu/index.html.
103 "There is no doubt these resources are a strategic objective that Israel's enemies
will try to undermine, and I have decided that Israel will defend its resources."
Netanyahu Vows to Defend Med Gas fields, CUMHURIYET (Jan. 19, 2011),
http://www.cumhuriyet.com/?hn=209634.
104 See Yaakov Katz, IDF Deploys Drones to Protect Gas Fields from Hezbollah,
THE JERUSALEM POST (Aug. 9, 2011), http://www.jpost.com/Defense/Article.aspx
?id=233002.
105 See id.
106 Id.
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natural gas annually.'0 7 Production has increased dramatically
since 2003, when the country was producing virtually no natural
gas.' 08 In contrast, the country consumes 117 billion cubic feet of
natural gas annually, a number that has also risen dramatically
since 2003."9 With consumption outpacing production, Israel
imported approximately 74 billion cubic feet of natural gas in
2010 and 25 billion cubic feet in 2011.'" As a net importer of
natural gas (and oil), the potential to develop natural gas off its
coast could transition Israel from a net-importer to a net-exporter
of energy.''
Egypt, Israel's neighbor to the south, met almost forty percent
of Israel's natural gas needs until 2012.' 12 The Arab Gas Pipeline
(AGP) was the primary means for transporting natural gas
between the countries."' Israel's agreement with Egypt was
reportedly initiated in 2005, though the pipeline connecting Sinai,
Egypt, to Ashkelon, Israel, was not complete until 2008.114 Israel
and Egypt have maintained relatively peaceful relations, and the
gas deal certainly ran the risk of escalating tensions between the
neighboring countries.'15  Additionally, Egyptians highly
disfavored the deal."' 6 After repeated interruptions along the AGP,
107 See Israel, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINinstration (May 30, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=IS#ng.
108 Id
109 Id.
110 Id.
lIl See id.
112 See Egypt, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN. (July 31, 2013),
http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=EG.
''3 Id.
114 See Loic Conan, Materialization of Political Risk in the Oil & Gas Industry:
The Case of Egypt in the Turmoil of the Arab Spring, 37 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 213, 225
(2012).
115 The Camp David Accords were signed in September 1978 by former Egyptian
President Muhammad Anwar al-Sadat, Prime Minister of Israel Menachem Begin, and
U.S. President Jimmy Carter, ending intense and long-standing conflict between Israel
and Egypt. Camp David Accords, ISRAEL MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
http://www.mfa.gov.ii/MFA/Peace%20Process/Guide%20to%20the%20Peace%20Proce
ss/Camp%20David%20Accords. The Accords provided for a framework for peace
between the two countries. See id
116 See Conan, supra note 114, at 226. See also Egypt Scraps Israel Gas Supply
Deal, BBC NEWS (April 23, 2012), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-
17808954.
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the fall of Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during the Arab
Spring, and disputes over gas pricing between the neighboring
countries, Egypt called off the gas supply deal in April 2012."' In
one fell swoop, forty percent of Israel's natural gas supply and one
third of Israel's total fuel supply was cut off."'
The discovery of natural gas in the eastern Mediterranean in
2009 changed Israel's prospects for energy and economic security.
In 2010, Israel's energy costs amounted to $10 billion-five
percent of the country's GDP."9 Experts claim that the Levant
Basin holds the largest natural gas reserve discovered in the last
decade and the largest known reserve in the Mediterranean.120 If
the experts are correct in estimating the volume of recoverable oil
and natural gas in the Levant Basin, Israel's development of those
resources could satisfy the country's domestic electricity needs for
an estimated twenty-five years, and enable Israel to transition from
an energy-importing to an energy-exporting nation.121 Without
question, this discovery holds enormous potential for economic
growth and promise for Israel's energy security in the decades to
come.12 2 Whether this discovery ensures Israel's national security
is another issue altogether, and one that Middle East geopolitical
experts debate.123  Experts are not debating the potential for this
117 The Israel-Egypt gas deal was negotiated under former Egyptian President
Mubarak's regime, and allegedly negotiations involved business people close to the
Mubarak family. See Conan, supra note 114, at 226. Following Mubarak's fall from
power in 2011, the AGP was attacked fourteen times, resulting in significant disruptions
in the supply of gas to Israel. See Egypt Scraps Israel Gas Supply Deal, supra note 116.
118 See David Kirkpatrick, Egypt Cancels the Delivery of Gas to Israel, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/23/world/middleeastlegypt-cancels-
delivery-of-natural-gas-to-israel.html?_r-0.
119 See What a Gas!, supra note 8.
120 See Tobias Buck, Field of Dreams: Israel's Natural Gas, FINANCIAL TIMES
MAGAZINE (Aug. 31, 2012) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/ldbda574-fl6d-1lel-a553-
00144fea
bdcO.html#axzz2Hcx5DyzY.
121 See O'Sullivan, supra note 1. See also Buck, supra note 120. In December
2012, the CEO of Episol Mutual Funds estimated that the reserves may contribute up to
$3.2 billion to Israel's GDP in 2013. See Eran Azran, Impact of Israeli Gas Fields Has
Been Hugely Underestimated, Says Analyst, HAARETZ (Dec. 12, 2012),
http://www.haaretz.com/business/impact-of-israeli-gas-field-has-been-hugely-
underestimated-says-analyst.premium-1.484253.
122 See Buck supra note 120.
123 See generally O'Sullivan, supra note I (highlighting the likelihood of a
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resource discovery to move the region toward peace-certainly
"plentiful, economical gas should be enough to push conflicts to
resolution," as one commentator has observed.124
III. The Legal Framework for Resolving Maritime Boundary
Disputes: The United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea
UNCLOS125 is the modem legal framework used by coastal
States to resolve maritime boundary conflicts.'26 The Convention
was signed by 119 countries in 1982 and has since been ratified by
165 nations in all.127 Neither Israel nor the United States is party
to the Convention.128 Analysts have dubbed the UNCLOS one of
the "most comprehensive treaties of all time," 29 culminating
thousands of years of "international relations, conflict, and ...
nearly universal adherence to an enduring order for ocean
space." 3 0 The Convention, commonly referred to as the
"constitution of the oceans," 3 ' is broad in scope and covers
territorial sea limits,132 conservation and management of the high
seas,13 3 protection of the marine environment,1' the definition and
boundary dispute when and if Israel's hostile neighbors make a claim to the reserves).
124 Id
125 UNCLOS, supra note 14. An electronic version of the Convention is available
at http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention agreements/convention overview
convention.htm.
126 Id
127 Chronological Lists of Ratifications of Accessions and Successions to the
Convention and the Related Agreements as at 23 January 2013, U.N. DIV. FOR OCEANS
AND LAW OF THE SEA (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/reference
files/chronological lists of ratifications.htm.
128 See Status of the Convention, supra note 18.
129 Ben Chigara, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and Customary
International Law, 22 Lov. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 433, 434 (2000).
130 Meagan P. Wilder, Who Gets the Oil?: Arctic Energy Exploration in Uncertain
Waters and the Need for Universal Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, 32 Hous. J. INT'L L. 505, 520 (2010).
131 Tommy T.B. Koh, President of the Third United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, Remarks at the Final Session of the Conference at Montego Bay,
Jamaica: A Constitution for the Ocean (Dec. 11, 1982), available at
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention agreements/texts/koh-english.pdf.
132 UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part I.
133 Id. Part VII, Section 2.
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rights of a state over the continental shelf,' and the limits of the
territorial seasl36 among many other maritime issues.'37  The
Convention is the result of an "unprecedented attempt" by the
international community to manage and regulate every aspect of
ocean and marine life and resources, and "bring a stable order to
mankind's very source of life."
The exclusive economic zone (EEZ) regime under Part V of
the Convention, and the settlement of disputes provisions under
Part XV providing for a binding procedure for settlement of
disputesl' are arguably the most relevant provisions under the
Convention in resolving the escalating Israel-Lebanon maritime
boundary dispute. A brief discussion of the history, scope, and
applicability of UNCLOS will inform the later discussion that
evaluates the viable options in resolving Lebanon and Israel's
maritime boundary dispute.
A. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea & the
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
The Convention was adopted in 1982 and entered into force in
1994.140 By the latter date, sixty states had ratified the
Convention.141 Its adoption followed centuries of evolving
maritime law, beginning with the Doctrine of Discovery, which
employed a "first come, first served" approach to territorial and
sea claims,14 2 to the more modern Freedom of the High Seas
Doctrine, which denied any individual country jurisdiction over
134 Id. Part XII.
135 Id. Part VI.
136 Id. Part II, Section 2.
137 Id. passim.
138 The Conference on the Law of the Sea began meeting in 1973. The United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas: A Historical Perspective, U.N. DIV. FOR
OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF THE SEA (1998), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/
convention agreements/convention historical-perspective.htm [hereinafter UNCLOS
Historical Perspective]. Several meetings and nine years later, the Convention was
finally adopted in 1983. Id.
'39 Id.
140 Chapter XX7, Law of the Sea, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/
Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=XXI-6-a&chapter-2 I &ang=en.
141 UNCLOS Historical Perspective, supra note 138.
142 Wilder, supra note 130, at 517.
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the ocean beyond a narrow strip of sea along a nation's
coastline.'4 3 Competing demands for fish and other natural
resources, the prospect of access to vast reserves of oil and natural
gas, increasing concerns over water pollution, revolutionary
technology, and ineffective legal means for dealing with the
increasing number of maritime conflicts all led Arvid Pardo,
Malta's Ambassador to the United Nations, to call for "an
effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor
beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction."l44 The
demarcation of three areas of territorial waters resulted.145
i. Territorial Demarcation Provisions
The Convention defines four distinct maritime boundaries-
the territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the continental shelf, and
the exclusive economic zone-each of which dictate the area over
which a coastal state may exert its authority.146  The process of
marking these boundaries, called delimitation, creates "varying
degrees of control for individual coastal states." 47  UNCLOS's
framework for dividing sea territory between neighboring coastal
states sharing common water is mostly consistent with the
customary international law that existed prior to the ratification of
the Convention, and provides a specific regime that allows for
varying jurisdictional rights in each coastal zone.148 Each of these
four zones is measured against a baseline, which generally follows
the contours of the coast.149  These contours are not static,
however, and may fluctuate because of destruction of the
coastline, erosion, mining, melting of glaciers, political decisions,
or other events.'o Prior to the adoption of UNCLOS, coastal
states claimed jurisdiction of the seas based on the "cannon shot
rule," which included all sea territory over which a cannon could
143 Id. at 519.
144 UNCLOS Historical Perspective, supra note 138.
145 Id.
146 Wilder, supra note 130, at 522-23.
147 Faraz Sanei, The Caspian Sea Legal Regime, Pipeline Diplomacy, and the
Prospects for Iran's Isolation from the Oil and Gas Frenzy: Reconciling Tehran's Legal
Options with its Geopolitical Realities, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 681, 790 (2001).
148 Id.
149 Lisztwan, supra note 19, at 154.
I50 See id.
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be launched from shore."' Needless to say, the cannon shot rule
was imprecise, and its use resulted in conflicting claims to sea
territory. 152
An extreme example of a changing coastline and the
subsequent impact on its territorial zones occurred off the coast of
Yemen. An arbitral tribunal concluded that a small island halfway
between Yemen and Eritrea belonged to Yemen, which allowed
Yemen to adjust and expand its four maritime zones to take the
tiny island into account.'53 In 2007, that tiny island all but
disappeared when a once-dormant volcano exploded. 5 4 Because
the tiny island was not completely destroyed, Yemen continues to
maintain control over its maritime zone as measured by the tiny
island.'"' Despite UNCLOS's comprehensive treatment, it does
not address the notion of an "ambulatory" baseline-a baseline
that shifts because of geographical changes,15 6 nor a baseline that
shifts (or is in flux) due to geopolitical changes.15 7
151 Id. at 167.
152 Id
153 See id at 154.
154 See id
155 Lisztwan, supra note 19, at 154
156 See id. at 155. While UNCLOS does not address shifting baselines based on
geopolitical changes, the existing international law for establishing maritime boundaries
provide a secure and stable framework for mediating disputes between bordering nations
with established maritime boundaries. See id at 157.
157 Id
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The Convention defines a nation's "territorial sea" as the
territory extending no more than twelve nautical miles from the
nation's baseline,'59 or the "low-water line along the coast."'
This area essentially "functions as a continuation of the nation's
land territory," irrespective of any extension of the continental
shelf.'6 ' A nation may exert complete sovereignty over its
territorial sea area, including subsurface resources, under
UNCLOS Article 2.162
The contiguous zone extends a nation's territorial waters an
additional twelve nautical miles; the contiguous zone cannot
extend beyond twenty-four nautical miles from the baseline from
158 This graphic provides an illustration of the maritime zones off the coast of the
eastern United States provided for under the Convention. Maritime Zones and
Boundaries, NOAA OFFICE OF THE GENERAL COUNSEL, available at
http://www.gc.noaa.gov/gcil maritime.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2013).
159 UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part II, Sect. 2, art. 3.
160 Id. at Part II, Sect. 2, art. 5.
161 Wilder, supra note 130, at 522.
162 Sanei, supra note 147, at 790.
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which the territorial sea is measured. 163 In this area, nations may
"prevent and punish infringement of its customs or laws." 64 In
short, the coastal nation may exert "police power" over the
contiguous zone, whereas the nation may claim full sovereign
rights to the ocean space covered in the territorial sea. 6 1
The continental shelf is defined by Article 76 of the
Convention as the "seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas that
extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural
prolongation of its land territory to the outer edge of the
continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the
baselines."166 The coastal state may exert sovereignty for the
"purpose of exploring ... and exploiting ... natural resources" of
the continental shelf.'6 ' Disputes over the demarcation of the
continental shelf for coastal states sharing ocean space remain. 168
In the event that a nation extends the bounds of its continental
shelf beyond 200 nautical miles from the baseline, that coastal
state must divide and share revenue from the exploitation of
minerals beyond the 200 mile marker.169  These funds are to be
distributed equally among the parties to the Convention. 7 e
The EEZ under Part V of the Convention "is one of the most
revolutionary features" of UNCLOS.17 ' The EEZ extends between
twenty-four nautical miles-the contiguous zone-and up to no
more than 200 nautical miles from the nation's baseline from
which the territorial sea is measured.172  The coastal state has
163 UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 33.
164 Wilder, supra note 130, at 523.
165 Wendy N. Duong, Following the Path of Oil: The Law of the Sea or
Realpolitik- What Good Does Law Do in the South China Sea Territorial Conflicts?, 30
FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1098, 1118 (2007).
166 UNCLOS supra note 14, Part VI, art. 76. The continental shelf can be extended
up to 350 nautical miles in the case of "submarine ridges." Duong, supra note 165, at
1118.
167 UNCLOS supra note 14, Part VI, art. 77.
168 For a brief discussion about the Denmark-Netherlands continental shelf dispute
and continuing questions as to the "equidistance rule," see Sanei, supra note 147, at 790-
98.
169 UNCLOS Historical Perspective, supra note 138.
170 See id.
171 Id. at 5.
172 UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 57.
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"sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources . . . of the waters
superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and
with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and
exploration of the zone . . . ."" A nation must "proclaim" the
EEZ-the zone is not automatically granted when a nation ratifies
UNCLOS.17 4 The outer limit of the continental shelf is designed to
coincide with the EEZ.175 The EEZ regime allows a coastal State
to "explore and exploit, conserve and manage" natural resources in
its EEZ, as defined by UNCLOS.' 76 Under Article 58, all states
have the right of "navigation and overflight and the laying of
submarine cables and pipelines" within a state's EEZ.' 77
The EEZ is a significant development in international maritime
law. With vast reserves of oil and natural gas located offshore,
coastal nations have been eager to lay claim to ocean resources to
meet domestic energy needs and to boost exports.178
ii. Dispute Resolution
The conflict resolution provisions are relatively
straightforward.179  Unlike many international agreements,
UNCLOS's dispute resolution mechanism is incorporated into the
Convention itself, and makes binding any resolution agreed to
under its provisions,'80 requiring signatories to use the mechanisms
provided for in the Convention to resolve disputes with other
signatories over issues arising under the Convention.' 8 ' The
Convention sets up two approaches for conflict resolution.182
173 Id. art. 56.
174 Duong, supra note 165, at 1120.
175 See UNCLOS Historical Perspective, supra note 138.
176 Wahlisch, supra note 11, at 2.
177 UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 58.
178 See UNCLOS Historical Perspective, supra note 138.
179 See Wdhlisch, supra note 11, at 2.
180 See Lisztwan, supra note 19, at 179-80 ("Boundaries established by an I.C.J.
judgment or by a decision of an arbitral body under UNCLOS are certainly binding,
final, and not appealable.").
181 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part XV. Article 279 obligates member states to
settle disputes by peaceful means, while Article 287 outlines the options from which
member States may choose as each state's binding dispute resolution procedure. Id.
182 See id.
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First, signatories may attempt to directly negotiate a settlement
between the parties.' In the event that direct talks fail, parties
have four options: "submission of the dispute to the International
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, adjudication by the ICJ,
submission to binding international arbitration procedures, or
submission to special arbitration tribunals" with expertise in
resolving the specific issue in dispute.'84 While the Convention
provides for the possibility that parties adjudicate the matter
before another tribunal, like the ICJ, the Convention also creates a
separate adjudicative body-the International Tribunal for the
Law of the Sea (ITLOS}-to settle matters under the
Convention.' In practice, the disputing parties either must agree
to one of these four options to resolve their dispute; otherwise the
Convention provides the default of arbitration.186
Before the Convention was adopted and came into force, the
ICJ had jurisdiction and considerable experience in deciding
maritime law issues.187 The jurisdiction of the ICJ and other
international tribunals depends in large part on parties voluntarily
submitting a dispute to the tribunal after it arises.' UNCLOS is
183 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 279-80.
184 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part XV, Sect. 2, art. 287. Exceptions to these
options may apply if parties are disputing fisheries within a state's EEZ. See John E.
Noyes, The International Tribunal for the Law of the Seas, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 109,
122 (1998).
185 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 287. The Statute of the International Tribunal
for the Law of the Sea is included in Annex VI of the Convention. Id. Annex VI.
Article 298, the Convention's "opt-out" provision, allows a signatory to declare that it
will not accept any of the procedural choices under Article 287, which would include
disputes regarding sea boundary delimitations. See id. art. 298.
186 See Noyes, supra note 184, at 120. Article 298 of the Convention allows
signatory states to opt out of any of the dispute resolution options outlined in Article 287.
See UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 298. Some argue that the Convention should be
amended to remove this opt-out provision, which allows parties to avoid binding
arbitration to settle disputes under the Convention. See generally Wilder, supra note
130, at 536 (arguing that rescinding the opt-out exception in Article 298 will encourage a
"fair and equitable" dispute resolution framework under the Convention).
187 See Noyes, supra note 184, at 111. The ICJ and its predecessor decided forty
cases concerning the law of the sea. Id. at 111, n. 9.
188 The Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that parties may enter
into special agreements to submit their dispute to the Court for resolution. See id. at 114
(distinguishing the process by which disputing parties submit their conflict to the ICJ
from the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea). For additional discussion of the
ICJ, see infra Part IV, B.
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unique in including a compulsory dispute resolution provisions,
requiring parties to the Convention to submit themselves to the
Tribunal or another resolution mechanism outlined in the
Convention even before a dispute with another member state
arises. "9
Historically, the compulsory nature of the third-party dispute
settlement mechanisms had both supporters and detractors.
Supporters argued that the requirement equalized the playing field
for developed and developing signatories to the Convention and
that the requirements legitimize the Convention's "compromise
'package deal."'l 90 Those initially against the dispute resolution
mechanisms favored less formal "consensus building methods" for
resolving disputes arising under the Convention.19 1 Despite these
concerns, all parties to the Convention have accepted its conflict
resolution provisions.192
The ITLOS was established under Annex VI of the
Convention as one of the compulsory third-party dispute
resolution procedures.' 93 The Tribunal itself is located in
Hamburg, Germany, and was established in 1994, when the
Convention itself came into force.' 94 The Tribunal has jurisdiction
over all disputes relating to the interpretation and application of
the Convention.19 5 It is comprised of twenty-one members, each
with "recognized competence in the field of the law of the sea"
and no two members are from the same member state.196
Some raised concerns that the establishment of a new tribunal
would lead to divergent jurisprudence in law of the seas cases.'97
Proponents, however, asserted that the Tribunal would have
jurisdiction over cases that the ICJ otherwise would not-
189 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part XV, art. 287. See also Noyes, supra note
184, at 114 (noting that this provision of the Convention is unique compared to other
international agreements of similar scope).
190 Noyes, supra note 184, at 115.
191 See id
192 See id at 117.
193 UNCLOS, supra note 14, Annex VI, art. 1.
194 See Noyes, supra note 184, at I10.
195 Jurisdiction, INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA, http://www.itlos.org/
index.php?id=I 1&L=0.
196 UNCLOS, supra note 14, Annex VI, arts. 2-3.
197 See Noyes, supra note 184, at 111.
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including over international organizations-and also argued that
the benefits of a tribunal composed of experts in this field of law
would be tremendous.19 8
The dispute between Lebanon and Israel falls squarely within
the Convention's provisions regarding the EEZ,'" and potentially,
the continental shelf.2 00 The ITLOS, the ICJ, and multiple arbiters
have jurisdiction to resolve this dispute under the Convention.20 1
B. International Court ofJustice and Customary
International Law
Prior to the enactment of UNCLOS and the creation of the
ITLOS, the ICJ handled maritime and law of the sea disputes.20 2
Article 287 of UNCLOS allows for parties to the Convention to
choose to settle their dispute in the ICJ, the ITLOS, or through
arbitration.20 3
The ICJ, located at The Hague, is the primary adjudicative
body of the United Nations. 20 4 The ICJ both settles legal disputes
between states and provides advisory opinions on legal issues
presented to it by states and U.N. agencies. 20 s The Court is
composed of fifteen judges, each serving a term of nine years;
judges are chosen by the U.N. General Assembly.206 The ICJ has
jurisdiction over conflicts involving individual states, but not over
conflicts involving international organizations.20 7 States that are
members of the United Nations can be party to contentious cases
before the Court.208
The ICJ, under its statute, applies "international custom, as
198 See id.
199 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 55-75.
200 See id arts. 76-85.
201 See id. arts. 55-75.
202 See generally Jonathan Charney, Progress in International Maritime Boundary
Delimitation Law, 88 A.J.I.L. 227 (1994) (describing the history of ICJ's jurisdiction
over maritime boundary disputes).
203 UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part XV, Sect. 2, art. 287.
204 See The Court, INT'L COURT OF JUSTICE, http://www.icj-cij.org/court/index.
php?pl=1.
205 See id.
206 See id.
207 See Noyes, supra note 184, at 111.
208 See The Court, supra note 204.
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evidence of a general practice accepted by law." 209  Customary
international law is "the law that is derived from state custom or
practice."210 Customary international law may, but does not
always, derive from international agreements, including
conventions like UNCLOS.2 1 1 Article 38 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that a provision of an
international treaty may become binding on a third party to the
treaty as a "customary rule of international law."2 12  For a
provision of a treaty to qualify as applicable customary
international law, the ICJ requires the following: (1) that the treaty
codify "existing customary international law"; (2) that the treaty
"crystalliz[e]" emergent law as customary international law; and
(3) that the treaty "initiate[] the progressive development of new
customary international law."2 13
UNCLOS arguably meets all of these requirements. First, the
Convention is recognized as a landmark international agreement,
codifying centuries of maritime law, from the rule of innocent
passage, to freedom of the high seas, to state sovereignty over
209 Statute of the International Court of Justice, art. 38(1) (June 26, 1945), available
at http://www.icj-cij.org/documents/index.php?pl-4&p2=2&p3=0.
210 Martin Lishexian Lee, The Interrelation Between the Law of the Sea Convention
and Customary International Law, 7 SAN DIEGO INT'L L. J. 405, 406 (2006).
211 See id. at 407-08. What qualifies as customary international law has evolved
over time and remains a subject of debate among international law scholars. See
generally Jonathan I. Charney, International Agreements and the Development of
Customary International Law, 61 WASH. L. REv. 971 (1986) (outlining various
frameworks through which scholars work to define what constitutes customary
international law and how the Law of the Sea treaty fits into various conceptions of
customary international law).
212 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 38, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, available at http://www.worldtradelaw.net/misc/viennaconvention.pdf.
213 Lee, supra note 210, at 408 (citing Charney, supra note 211, at 971). The
Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law posits that customary international law is
derived from "a general and consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense
of obligation," and provides that international agreements may create customary
international law when the agreement is "widely accepted" and "intended for adherence
by states generally." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(3)-(4).
The ICJ adopted this approach to recognizing customary international law in its decision
in the North Sea Continental Shelf case of 1969. See North Sea Continental Shelf
(F.R.G./Den.; F.R.G./Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 37-38, available at
http://www.sovereigngeographic.com/maritimepdf/1 969-germany-den-neth-
english.pdf.
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territorial seas.214 Second, the Convention brings together in
comprehensive form centuries of maritime law in one document
receiving broad acceptance.2 15 The ICJ has acknowledged that a
rule can become part of customary international law even before
the agreement goes into effect; and thus, that emergent law can
become part of customary international law.216 The EEZ is an
emergent international legal norm that UNCLOS codified, and is
widely accepted by its signatories and non-signatories alike.2 17
Finally, the ICJ recognizes that progressive international legal
norms may be considered customary international law where there
is "widespread and representative participation of States" and
"uniform state practice," even if the particular norm in question
has not been accepted by all nations.2 18 UNCLOS has been signed
by 157 and ratified by 166 nations, demonstrating its broad
worldwide support.2 19 While the United States is not a signatory to
the Convention, the Restatement of Foreign Relations recognizes
the concept of the EEZ as customary international law, as well as
many other provisions of the Convention.220
Some scholars caution international tribunals against adopting
international treaties as customary international law.22 ' For one,
there is always the risk that tribunals will do so without
scrutinizing the treaty under the rigors of the standards discussed
above.2 22 There is also concern about imposing rules arising from
international agreements on non-parties that actively dissent from
214 See e.g., Lee, supra note 210, at 410 (describing the many provisions of
UNCLOS that are derived from historic maritime law). See also Wilder, supra note 130,
at 517-18 (providing a legal history of the Convention).
215 The Convention has been ratified by 166 nations. Status of the Convention,
supra note 18.
216 See Lee, supra note 210, at 414.
217 See Chamey, supra note 211, at 987 (noting that the Restatement of Foreign
Relations Law of the United States has accepted the EEZ as customary international
law); see also Lee, supra note 210, at 414-15.
218 See Lee, supra note 210, at 417.
219 See Status of the Convention, supra note 18.
220 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 102(3)-(4).
221 See Chigara, supra note 129, at 451-52 (discussing the risk that ITLOS and ICJ
will adopt the Convention as customary international law without formally evaluating
whether the treaty meets the requirements of the ICI).
222 Id
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those agreements.223
Nevertheless, it is likely, if not certain, that any tribunal,
including the ICJ, adopting "customary international law," will
apply UNCLOS provisions to a dispute concerning the
interpretation and application of the provisions of the
Convention.224 As Israel and Lebanon are debating the delineation
of their respective EEZs, any tribunal mediating a conflict between
these two nations likely will be responsible for applying the
Convention.225
III. Recent Attempted Resolutions to Maritime Boundary
Disputes in the Mediterranean Sea and Elsewhere
Turkey, Syria, Cyprus, Israel, and Lebanon border the
Mediterranean's eastern shore, and each country at one time or
another has claimed some portion of the eastern Mediterranean as
its own.2 26  Lebanon and Cyprus attempted to demarcate a
maritime boundary dividing the countries' territorial seas, but
were unsuccessful.2 27 Israel and Cyprus, however, successfully
reached agreement on their maritime boundaries, despite strong
protests in the region.228
A. Establishing Exclusive Economic Zones in the Eastern
Mediterranean: Lebanon and Cyprus in 2007, Israel and
Cyprus in 2010, and Unilateral Proposals.
Lebanon and Cyprus agreed to the geographical coordinates of
their respective maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean
223 See e.g., Charney, supra note 211, at 981 (noting that international agreements
addressing extradition, taxation, and international trade are rarely adopted as customary
international law).
224 See infra Part IV(ii).
225 See infra Part Ill.
226 See Beth Gardiner, New Energy Opportunities and Old Disputes, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 12, 2012) (discussing the various claims by Israel, Lebanon, and Cyprus to energy
reserves in the eastern Mediterranean and Turkey's concern over Cyprus's exploration
efforts).
227 Id.
228 See Agreement Between the State of Israel and the Government of the Republic
of Cyprus on the Delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone, Dec. 27, 2010, available
at http://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/No%20Volume/48387/PartI-48387-0800
0002802dl2b7.pdf [hereinafter Israel-Cyprus EEZ Agreement].
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in 2007.229 The Cypriot government ratified the agreement almost
immediately, but the Lebanese government failed to do the
same. 23 0 It is possible that the Lebanese government was anxious
to commit to a so-called "Point 1," the agreed division between
Cyprus and Lebanon in the 2007 negotiations, before the maritime
border with Israel was established.23' Others speculate that
Lebanon was under pressure from Turkey not to ratify the
agreement.2 32 Lebanon's hesitation may also be attributable to a
fractured and dysfunctional government.2 33
Three years later, in December 2010, Israel and Cyprus
entered into a binding agreement demarcating each country's EEZ
in the eastern Mediterranean.2 34 Cyprus and Israel ratified the
agreement and the agreement went into force in February 2011.235
The Agreement "recall[s]" the UNCLOS and uses the Convention
to establish each country's EEZ.23 6 In July 2011, Israel submitted
a list of coordinates for its EEZ to the United Nations, based on its
earlier agreement with Cyprus.237
Almost immediately, Lebanon protested to the Israel-Cyprus
229 See Wahlisch, supra note 11, at 2.
230 See id.
231 See Michal Shmulovich, Cyprus Offers to Mediate Between Israel and Lebanon
Over Offshore Gas Dispute, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 3, 2012),
http://www.timesofisrael.com/cyprus-offers-to-mediate-between-israel-and-lebanon-
over-offshore-gas-dispute/ (noting that Lebanon's failure to ratify the agreement may be
motivating Cyprus to offer to mediate the conflict between Israel and Lebanon). See
also Wahlisch, supra note I1, at 2.
232 See Hiyam Kossayfi, Oil in the Mediterranean: First Come, First Served,
ALAKHBAR ENGLISH (July 3, 2012), http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/9192.
233 See generally Waleed Hazbun, From Lebanon, With Pessimism and Hope, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 3, 2011), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/03/03/from-lebanon-
with-pessimism-and-hope/? r-0 (describing Lebanon's political tumult and the
despondent and pessimistic attitudes many Lebanese share as a result).
234 See Israel-Cyprus EEZ Agreement, supra note 228.
235 See W5hlisch, supra note 11, at 3.
236 Israel-Cyprus EEZ Agreement, supra note 228.
237 List of Geographic Coordinates For the Delimitation of the Northern Limit of
the Territorial Sea and Exclusive Economic Zone of the State of Israel in WGS84,
transmitted by a communication dated July 12, 2011 from the Permanent Mission of
Israel to the United Nations addressed to the Secretariat of the United Nations, available
at http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/isr-eez
northemlimit20I .pdf
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boundary agreement. 238 The Lebanese government issued a formal
complaint to the United Nations in June 2011, claiming that the
agreement between Israel and Cyprus violated the agreement made
between Lebanon and Cyprus and violated Lebanon's
"sovereignty and economic rights."23 9 Lebanon claimed that the
Israel-Cyprus delimitation agreement moved the median unitary
line, depriving Lebanon of more than 850 square kilometers of its
EEZ.240 Cyprus was eager to reach agreement with one of the
parties and begin exploration of natural resources in its territorial
seas and moved forward with its agreement with Israel, despite
protests from the Lebanese government.2 4' While Israel and
Cyprus have both begun exploration and development activities in
the disputed waters, Lebanon has yet to make any meaningful
progress in development or exploration.242 The resolution of the
disagreement between Cyprus and Lebanon will inform any
agreement with Israel, as the location on the coast between Israel
and Lebanon is the reference point from which the EEZ is
drawn.243
In addition to submitting a formal complaint to the United
Nations over the Cyprus-Israel EEZ delimitation, Lebanon
proceeded to submit three proposals for its EEZ between August
2010 and November 2011.244 The most recent submission to the
United Nations indicated that the boundaries submitted to the
United Nations may be amended "in the light of negotiations with
the relevant neighbouring States," suggesting Lebanon's openness
238 See Lebanon Files UN Complaint Over Israel-Cyprus EEZ Deal, JERUSALEM
POST (June 22, 2011, 11:24 AM), http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=
226058.
239 Id
240 Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation, MIDDLE EAST
ECONOMIC SURVEY (Oct. 1, 2011), http://www.mees.com/en/articles/6015-cyprus-
lebanon-cyprus-israel-ofshore-delimitation.
241 See Kossayfi, supra note 232.
242 See Antoun Issa & Hassan Chakrani, Lebanon Losing Race for Mediterranean
Oil, ALAKH8AR ENGLISH (Nov. 20, 2011), http://english.al-akhbar.com/node/1687.
243 See Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation, supra note 240.
244 See Lebanon, Submission in Compliance with the Deposit Obligations Pursuant
to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. DEP'T OF TREATIES AND
LEGISLATION (July 12, 2012), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONAND
TREATIES/STATEFILES/LBN.htm.
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to negotiation in establishing a binding maritime boundary.2 45
While both Israel and Lebanon have submitted their respective
proposals to the United Nations, without a formal agreement
between the countries, the proposals remain non-binding and
subject to amendment.2 4 6
B. Resolution of the Arctic Maritime Boundary Dispute
The eastern Mediterranean is not the only body of water in
which multiple bordering countries dispute maritime boundaries,
nor is it the only area for which a resolution over maritime
boundaries has been difficult to achieve.24 7 The Arctic, like the
Mediterranean, holds vast, valuable reserves of oil and natural
24gas.248 Climate change, resulting in the melting of ice in the arctic
region, has made the area more navigable and conducive to mining
activities. 249 The region has been considered international territory
since 1997.250 Each of five nations, including Russia, Canada,
Norway, Denmark, and the United States, have taken steps to lay
claim to territory in the area in what has been called the "Cold
Rush." 251 Each nation claims that its continental shelf-one of the
four maritime boundaries provided for under UNCLOS-extends
to the Arctic, and thus that each should have the right to explore
245 Decree 6433, Delineation of the Boundaries of the Exclusive Economic Zone of
Lebanon, U.N. DEP'T OF TREATIES AND LEGISLATION (Nov. 16, 2011),
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/LEGISLATIONANDTREATIES/PDFFILES/bn201Idecr
ee6433.pdf.
246 See Wthlisch, supra note 11, at 3.
247 See infra notes 248-252 and accompanying text.
248 The Arctic is estimated to hold ninety billion barrels of oil, 1,760 trillion cubic
feet of natural gas, and forty-four billion barrels of natural gas liquids, accounting for a
total of approximately twenty-two percent of the "undiscovered, technically recoverable"
natural resources in the world. 90 Billion Barrels of Oil and 1,670 Trillion Cubic Feet of
Natural Gas Assessed in the Arctic, U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURV. (July 23, 2008),
http://www.usgs.gov/newsroom/article.asp?ID=1 980&from=rsshome.
249 See Wilder, supra note 130, at 512.
250 The Arctic became international territory upon the signing of UNCLOS. Id. at
507.
251 See id. at 512-13. Russia has attempted to claim the Arctic and North Pole as
its own by planting a Russian flag on the sea floor beneath the North Pole. See David
Greene, Russia Pushes to Claim Arctic As Its Own, NAT'L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 16, 2011,
9:01 AM), http://www.npr.org/2011/08/16/139577789/russia-pushes-to-claim-arctic-as-
its-own.
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and develop the resources in its continental shelf area in the
Arctic. 25 2
The Convention provides multiple options for delineating the
continental shelves of each of these countries and is useful for
resolving disputes among member nations. Russia, Norway,
Denmark, and Canada are all parties to the Convention.253  The
United States, however, has yet to ratify the Convention.2 54
Denmark and Norway have chosen the ICJ to resolve any dispute
arising under the Convention.2 55 Canada has chosen the ITLOS
and an arbitral tribunal under Article 287 of Annex VII. 25 6 Upon
its signature to the Convention in 1982, Russia chose an arbitral
tribunal under Article 287 of Annex VII of the Convention.2 57
While the United States has not ratified the Convention and is not
required to choose a procedure by which to resolve this dispute
under the Convention, the United States signed the Ilulissat
Declaration25 8 with the other four Arctic nations claiming territory
252 See Wilder, supra note 130, at 513-17.
253 Norway ratified the convention in 1996, Russia in 1997, Canada in 2003, and
Denmark in 2004. Status of the Convention, supra note 18.
254 While each of the last three sitting U.S. presidents has supported ratifying the
Convention, the U.S. Senate has yet to take any action. US. Leaders Support Law of the
Sea Treaty, WORLDWATCH INST., http://www.worldwatch.org/node/5993. See also
President's Statement on Advancing U.S. Interests in the World's Oceans, THE WHITE
HOUSE (May 15, 2007), http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/
2007/05/20070515-2.html (stating President Bush's reasons for supporting the
Convention); Josh Rogin, Clinton: Ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty This Year, FOREIGN
POL'Y (May 23, 2012, 10:00 AM), http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/
05/23/clintonratify_1awof the sea treaty thisyear (stating Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton's reasons for supporting the Convention). President Obama is expected to
encourage the U.S. Senate to take action on the Treaty in his second term. See John B.
Bellinger III, Obama's Weakness on Treaties, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 18, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/19/opinion/obamas-weakness-on-treaties.html
(discussing the need for President Obama to push for approval of the Convention). See
also Wilder, supra note 130, at 532-33 (describing the benefits of adopting the
Convention).
255 Declarations and Statements, U.N. DIV. FOR OCEAN AFFAIRS AND THE LAW OF
THE SEA (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/convention_agreements/
conventiondeclarations.htm#Denmark%20Upon%20ratification.
256 Id
257 Id. Upon ratification, however, Russia opted out of the binding dispute
resolution provisions of the Convention in regards to sea boundary delimitations. Id.
258 The Ilulissat Declaration, U.S.-Can.-Den.-Nor.-Russ., May, 28, 2008, available
at http://www.oceanlaw.org/downloads/arctic/Ilulissat Declaration.pdf.
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in the Arctic. 25 9  The Declaration explicitly provides that the
dispute over the Arctic will be resolved using the existing
framework provided by the Convention.2 60 As of this writing, no
progress has been made in negotiating the maritime boundaries in
the Arctic.26 1 Progress on the Declaration could be expected once
the United States ratifies the Convention and chooses a procedure
for dispute resolution under Article 287.262 With many scholars,
the business community, environmentalists, and the energy
industry supporting ratification of the Convention, the U.S. Senate
very well may take action in the 113th Congress.263
IV. Options for Resolving the Israel-Lebanon Maritime
Boundary Dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean
The demarcation of the EEZ is the primary point of
disagreement between Lebanon and Israel.2 ' The accessible
reserves of natural gas and oil are approximately forty to eighty
nautical miles off the coast of the two countries, putting the
reserves squarely within the 200-mile EEZ of one or both
countries.265 Israel has moved quickly both to claim the reserves
259 BROOKS YEAGER, THE ILULISSAT DECLARATION: BACKGROUND AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR ARCTIC GOVERNANCE 1-2 (2008), available at
http://arcticgovemance.custompublish.com/the-ilulissat-declaration-background-and-
implications-for-arctic-govemance.4626039-137746.html.
260 Id. at 2.
261 See generally Arctic Maritime Boundary Resources, Treaties and Claims,
COLUM. L. SCH., http://web.law.columbia.edu/climate-change/resources/climate-change-
laws-world/arctic/arctic-maritime-boundary-resources (providing links to UNCLOS
submissions and maritime boundary agreements) (last visited Oct. 7, 2013).
262 See Wilder, supra note 130, at 539-40 (discussing the benefits to all parties if
U.S. ratifies the Convention).
263 Compare Jackie Northam, Senate Pressured to Ratify 'Law of the Sea,' NAT'L
PUB. RADIO (July 24, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.npr.org/2012/07/24/157313900/
senate-pressured-to-ratify-law-of-the-sea (describing Congressional support for ratifying
the Convention) with Larry Bell, Will US. Sovereignty Be LOST at Sea? Obama
Supports Treaty that Redistributes Drilling Revenues, FORBES (May 20, 2012, 1:09 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/larrybell/2012/05/20/will-u-s-sovereignty-be-lost-at-sea-
obama-signs-u-n-treaty-that-redistributes-drilling-revenues/ (offering a contrary
perspective).
264 See Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation, supra note 240
(discussing the dispute over the demarcation line).
265 Estimates as to the distance between the natural gas field and Israel's coast vary
from 45 to 80 miles. See generally John C.K. Daly, Israel Eyes Gas Reserves in
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as its own and to lay the foundation for the development of the
offshore resources.2 6 6 As of mid-2012, Israel was contracting with
U.S.-based Nobel Energy to develop all portions of the Levant
Basin reserves.2 67  The Israeli cabinet is actively defending the
reserves, which would significantly expand the territory over
which the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) has responsibility.26 8 In
fact, the IDF is pushing for a share of any future royalties for oil
and natural gas exploration off its coast.269
For its part, the Lebanese government has requested that the
U.N. Secretary General pressure Israel to put an end to border
violations and to cease exploration of resources Lebanon claims as
its own.270 Specifically, former Prime Minister Sa'ad Hariri asked
the United Nations to enforce U.N. Resolution 1701 and to put
pressure on Israel to "cease its violations in the air, on land and at
sea." 271 As noted by a spokesperson for Secretary-General Ban Ki
Moon, Resolution 1701 addresses only the land border between
the two countries and not the maritime border.272 Internally, the
Contested Waters, CHRISTIAN Sa. MONITOR (Sept. 25, 2012),
http://www.csmonitor.com/Environment/Energy-Voices/2012/0925/Israel-eyes-gas-
reserves-in-contested-waters (noting that one gas reserve is as close as 45 nautical miles
off the coast of Israel).
266 See id (discussing Israel's claims to the resources in the eastern
Mediterranean). See also Mary E. Stonaker, Massive Energy Discoveries Complicate
Relations Between Israel and Lebanon, AL ARABIYA (June 24, 2011),
http://english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/06/24/154627.html (discussing Israel's quick
reaction to discovery of resources in the Levant Basin).
267 See Daly, supra note 265 (discussing Noble's role in developing the Levant
basin).
268 See id. (discussing Israel's options in defending the resources).
269 Avi Bar-Eli, Israel's Defense Ministry Pushing for Share of Future Natural
Gas Royalty Fund, HAARETZ (Oct. 21, 2012), http://www.haaretz.com/business/israel-s-
defense-ministry-pushing-for-share-of-future-natural-gas-royalty-fund.premium-
1.471222.
270 Hariri Asks UN to Put 'Utmost Pressure on Israel,' JERUSALEM POST (Jan. 10,
2011, 12:25 PM), http://www.jpost.com/MiddleEast/Article.aspx?id=202939 [hereinafter
Hariri Asks UN].
271 Id. See Dana Khraiche, Lebanon Asks U.N. to Protect Peace over Maritime
Borders, DAILY STAR (Aug. 22, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/
News/Politics/201 1/Aug-22/Lebanon-asks-UJN-to-protect-peace-over-maritime-
borders.ashx#ixzzlZwZFq5Qy (noting Lebanon's request that the UN enforce
Resolution 1701).
272 Hariri Asks UN, supra note 270.
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Lebanese government has created the Petroleum Administration
Authority and staffed the board with six members, each of which
will lead a unit with specified duties in exploration and
development of natural resources off its coast.2 73
Disputes over the maritime boundary threaten the economic
and political stability of the region.274 Countries in the Middle
East have often resorted to military conflict to resolve their
differences, as evidenced by the ongoing conflict between Israel
and its neighbors, including Lebanon.2 75 Israel's other neighbor to
the north, Syria, is currently involved in an intense and bloody
civil war.276  There is enormous incentive for Israel and Lebanon
273 See Lebanon Steps on Gas but Progress is Slow, UPI (Nov. 29, 2012, 3:08
PM), http://www.upi.com/BusinessNews/Energy-Resources/2012/11/29/Lebanon-steps
-on-gas-but-progress-slow/UPI-87291354219723/ (discussing the creation and makeup
of the Petroleum Administration Authority); see also Lebanon Petroleum
Administration, LEBANESE REPUBLIC, MINISTRY OF ENERGY & WATER,
http://www.lebanon-exploration.com/DownLoads/Flyer/Leb PA Flyer 15Feb2Ol3.pdf
(describing the members of the organization). Even the U.S. has weighed in on the
conflict. See Laura Rozen, Official: US Proposed Map to Israel and Lebanon to
Advance Maritime Gas Exploration, BACK CHANNEL (Dec. 5, 2012),
http://backchannel.al-monitor.com/index.php/2012/12/341 1/us-proposed-map-to-israel-
and-lebanon-to-advance-maritime-gas-exploration/. In November 2012, U.S. Deputy
Assistant Secretary (DAS) for Energy Diplomacy, Amos Hochstein, presented a map of
proposed maritime boundaries to Lebanon and Israel. Id. Additionally, DAS Hochstein
participated in a roundtable discussion with Lebanese officials to discuss how Lebanon
can attract investment and create an environment for potential gas exporters. US
Mediating Lebanon's Maritime Border Dispute, ASPEN INSTITUTE (Dec. 6, 2012),
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/middle-east-programs/us-lebanon-
dialogue/the-lebanon-bulletin/us-mediating-lebanons [hereinafter US Mediating]. For a
video of the discussion with DAS Hochstein and other experts, see
http://www.aspeninstitute.org/video/ 12912-murky-waters-natural-gas-eastern-
mediterranean.
274 See Press Conf UN. Lebanon, supra note 15 (discussing the threat to security
created by the maritime dispute). See also Stonaker, supra note 266 (discussing the
maritime boundary dispute's potential to cause further military conflict).
275 See generally Wthlisch, supra note 11 at 1, 4 (summarizing the history of
conflict between Israel and Lebanon, noting that disputes over natural resources in the
Middle East have often resulted in military conflict); see also O'Sullivan, supra note I
(describing the threat of military conflict over the reserves in the Mediterranean as real
but not necessary to resolve the maritime boundary dispute in the region).
276 See, e.g., Michael Pizzi, Hopes fade for Syria peace talks next month, AL
JAZEERA AMERICA (Oct. 31, 2013), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/10/30/
hopes-fade-for-syriapeacetalksnextmonth.html (discussing the ongoing efforts to
peacefully resolve the Syrian civil war and noting the likelihood that a November 2013
peace conference wherein negotiators had hoped to move toward resolution would be
964
NATURAL GAS AND THE LEVANT BASIN
to resolve their differences peacefully, given the economic
implications and potential for energy security in developing the
natural gas and oil resources of the eastern Mediterranean.277
Private sector actors, including U.S.-based Nobel Energy, may
also want to see this dispute resolved peacefully, given the large
investments already made in developing the existing natural
resources. 278  As one commentator has put it, "going to court is
always cheaper than going to war."279
What follows is an evaluation of Israel's and Lebanon's
options, given existing international law frameworks and dispute
resolution options.280 First, this section discusses what, if any,
options the countries have under UNCLOS. 28 1  Following the
discussion of options under UNCLOS, this section explores
whether the ICJ is an appropriate forum for the resolution of this
dispute.28 2 Finally, this section discusses the possibility of
mediation by the United Nations and international arbitration as
delayed). See also Babak Dehghanpisheh, Bombings, Clashes Reported in Syrian
Capital, WASHINGTON POST (Feb. 21, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
world/middle east/bombings-clashes-reported-in-syrian-capital/2013/02/21/d40a3232-
7c20-11e2-a044-676856536b40_story.htmi (detailing the attacks in the Syrian capital,
Damascus, in the ongoing conflict between the Free Syrian Army and the government
forces backing Syrian President Bashar al-Asad). Syria has historically been one of
Lebanon's primary sources for energy, and the resolution of the conflict in Syria will
have implications for Lebanese energy security, regardless of whether Lebanon develops
any natural gas off its coast. See generally Syria, U.S. ENERGY INFORMATION ADMIN.
(Feb. 20, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/countries/cab.cfm?fips=SY (noting that Syria's
energy sector is suffering significant damage as internal fighting continues).
277 See generally U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, supra note 4, at 1, available at
http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf (describing the vast resources
available in the Levant Basin).
278 Multiple countries are disputing maritime borders in the South China Sea, and
some scholars argue that the private sector will play a large role in mediating the
competing maritime claims. See generally Duong, supra note 165 (arguing that the
private sector will play a "crucial" role in negotiating bilateral and multilateral
agreements over maritime disputes when energy resources are at stake).
279 Make Law, Not War: How to Resolve Spats over Sea Borders, THE ECONOMIST
(Aug. 25, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21560849.
280 Lebanese Foreign Affairs and Immigration Minister, Adnan Mansour, has
expressed the nation's intention to take steps to resolution "within a legal framework."
Lebanon Files UN Complaint over Israel-Cyprus EEZ Deal, supra note 238.
281 See infra notes 284-332 and accompanying text.
282 See infra notes 333-351 and accompanying text.
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alternative options for resolution.283 Important to consider under
each option is whether Israel is willing to consent to an arbitral
body's mediation and whether the Lebanese government would
allow the arbitration or mediation to proceed given the veto power
wielded by Hezbollah within the government.
A. Options Under the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea
As discussed above, the Convention requires peaceful
resolution of disputes arising under its provisions. Below is a brief
discussion of the viability of these options including conciliation,
utilization of the ITLOS, and arbitration.28 4 Many parties to the
Convention have chosen one of the four dispute resolution
mechanisms outlined in Article 287 of the Convention when
disputes with other member states have arisen.285 Lebanon has not
made such a choice under Article 287.286
i. Israel to Ratify the Convention.
Israel has yet to sign or ratify the Convention.2 87 Other nations
joining Israel in their resistance to the Convention include the
United States, Turkey, Syria, and a number of landlocked
nations.2 88 In the United States, the topic of signing and ratifying
the treaty has come up numerous times in the Convention's thirty-
year history and, despite the United States' status as a non-party,
the Convention has broad support among U.S. politicians,
environmentalists, and diplomats. 289 During the 112th Congress, a
283 The United Nations Interim Force has already played a significant role in
facilitating peaceful dispute resolutions between the two nations in other areas. See infra
notes 352-373 and accompanying text.
284 See infra notes 285-332 and accompanying text.
285 "When signing, ratifying or acceding to this Convention or at any time
thereafter, a State shall be free to choose ... one or more of the following means for
settlement of disputes." UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 287. For a list of member states'
choice of procedure, see Settlement of Disputes Mechanism, U.N. DIV. FOR OCEANS AND
THE LAW OF THE SEA (Apr. 10, 2013), http://www.un.org/Depts/los/settlement
ofdisputes/choice procedure.htm. It is important to note that Lebanon has not chosen a
primary means of dispute resolution under the Convention. Id.
286 See Declarations and Statements, supra note 255.
287 Status of the Convention, supra note 18.
288 Id.
289 See Keith Johnson, GOP Scuttles Law-of-the-Sea Treaty, WALL ST. J. (July 16,
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group of Republican senators rebuffed Senate Majority Leader
Harry Reid's efforts to bring the treaty to the floor for a vote,
citing concerns over U.S. national sovereignty, and the potential
taxation implications.290 Whether Israel shares these same
concerns is unclear.2 91
Some in Israel are calling for the country to ratify the
Convention.2 92 Citing the delicate political situation, the recent
cut-off in energy supply to Israel, and the promise of energy
security from the natural resource reserves in the Mediterranean,
some suggest that ratification may be in Israel's best interest. 293
2012, 5:06 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2012/07/16/gop-opposition-scuttles-law-
of-sea-treaty/ (discussing the Convention's support in the U.S.). For a detailed
discussion about the importance of the U.S.'s ratification of the Convention for the
resolution of the natural resources dispute in the Arctic, see generally Wilder, supra note
130.
290 See Austin Wright, Law of the Sea Treaty Sinks in Senate, POLITICO (July 6,
2012, 4:31 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0712/78568.html (discussing the
rejection of the Convention in the Senate); see also Johnson, supra note 289 (discussing
Republican opposition to the Convention); Steven Groves & Nicolas Loris, Law of the
Sea Treaty: Bad for American Energy Policy, THE HERITAGE FOUNDATION (July 9,
2012), http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/07/law-of-the-sea-treaty-bad-for-
american-energy-policy (discussing concerns over the risk of the U.S. signing the
Convention).
291 The specific reason or reasons for Israel's failure to ratify are outside the scope
of this Comment; however, one can speculate that the failure of Israel's closest ally, the
U.S., to ratify, has influenced Israel's decision to withhold its support. See generally
Clyde Mark, Israeli-United States Relations, POL'Y ALMANAC (Oct. 17, 2002),
http://www.policyalmanac.org/world/archive/crs israeli-us relations.shtml (describing
the development of a special relationship between the United States and Israel regarding
international policies). Perhaps also influencing Israel's hesitation to ratify is the fact
that numerous countries that are party to the convention are hostile to Israel. See
Declarations and Statements, supra note 255 (listing statements by Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar,
and Yemen stipulating that their ratification of the Convention does not imply a
recognition of the state of Israel). Finally, one may argue that it is in Israel's self-interest
to resist ratification, given that the country has had few maritime disputes. But see
David Newman, Israel's Maritime Disputes, THE JERUSALEM POST (July 11, 2011, 9:51
PM), http://wwwjpost.com/Opinion/Columnists/Israels-maritime-boundaries (arguing
that "[i]n the present international climate, Israel does not do itself any favors by
refusing to play ball, or by making demands not in accordance with accepted
regulations.")
292 See Newman, supra note 291 (discussing the reasons why Israel should sign the
Convention).
293 See generally id. (describing the circumstances that make signing the
Convention a quality option for Israel).
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Other scholars call for universal ratification of the Convention,
noting the economic and political security concerns that arise
when parties act in their self-interest in developing natural
resources in what they claim to be their maritime territory.294 It is
also important to note that Israel has implicitly accepted the terms
of the Convention by demarcating its EEZ with Cyprus.29 5
Other nations bordering the Mediterranean, including
Lebanon, Egypt, Cyprus, and Greece, have accepted the
Convention, .demonstrating the Convention's support in the
region.29 6 Additionally, given that Israel may be held to the
Convention as customary international law before the ICJ or
another arbitral tribunal, it is unclear what, if any, harm may come
from its ratification of the Convention in the specific context of
dispute resolution. 297  Finally, it is possible that ratification by
Israel's close ally and supporter, the United States, may prompt
Israel to reconsider its resistance to the Convention.29 8
ii. Conciliation under Article 284 and Annex V
Article 284 of the Convention provides that a signatory to the
Convention can submit any dispute "concerning the interpretation
or application" of the Convention to conciliation.29 9 This means of
resolving a dispute does not require both parties to be signatories
to the Convention.3 00 Exercising this option would require
294 Wilder observes:
Abandoning UNCLOS would only weaken current international ... law, create
economic uncertainty, and pose potential security issues .. .. Considering the
enormous economic wealth at stake, coupled with the political power of today's
oil, abandoning UNCLOS might erroneously be interpreted by some as
encouraging military solutions to . .. territorial disputes.
Wilder, supra note 130, at 532. See also Duong supra note 165, at 1133-36 (discussing
the significance of the U.S.'s reluctance to ratify the Convention).
295 See supra notes 234-237 and accompanying text.
296 See Status of the Convention, supra note 18.
297 See supra notes 202-225 and accompanying text.
298 See generally Mark, supra note 291 (discussing the close relationship between
the U.S. and Israel).
299 UNCLOS, supra note 14, art. 284.
300 Article 284 provides that "a State Party" may submit the dispute to conciliation
proceedings under Annex V, Sect. I of the Convention. Id. Other sections under this
part require that both parties in the dispute be parties to the Convention. See, e.g.,
UNCLOS, supra note 14, Annex 2, Sect. 2.
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Lebanon to invite Israel to enter into conciliation proceedings, and
for Israel to accept the invitation in writing.30 ' Each party may
nominate four conciliators among the list maintained by the
Secretary-General, and a total of five conciliators would mediate
302the dispute between the countries. These requirements are not
procedurally onerous, and conciliation should be the first step in
attempting to resolve disputes under the Convention.30 3 Article
279 provides that parties are to resolve disputes "by peaceful
means," and if peaceful means, including conciliation, are not
successful, the parties must choose between ITLOS, ICJ, and
arbitration.30 4 The likelihood of a voluntary resolution of the
dispute, without the assistance of arbitrators or an international
tribunal, is unlikely given the history between the two countries.30 5
One would expect the groundwork for a friendly resolution to have
been laid at this stage were this option pursued.30 6 Additionally,
since conciliation under the Convention does not produce a result
binding on either party, this is the least likely of the options
available to produce a meaningful result.307
iii. International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
As previously noted, Lebanon is a party to the Convention, and
thus the ITLOS would have jurisdiction over a dispute arising
under the Convention.308 Despite Israel's failure to ratify the
301 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Annex V, Sect. 1, art. I (stating the need for
written acceptance in a conciliation).
302 Id. art. 2.
303 See id. Part XV, Sect. 1, art. 279 (stating the desire to peacefully negotiate
solutions).
304 Id
305 See generally Cyprus-Lebanon, Cyprus-Israel Offshore Delimitation, supra
note 240 (describing the tension between Lebanon and Israel, and the nations' lack of a
willingness to negotiate in an effort to resolve the territorial dispute).
306 See supra notes 229-246 and accompanying text.
307 See e.g., Carlos Santamaria, Arbitration Will Not Solve WPS Dispute - Expert,
RAPPLER (Feb. 3, 2013, 10:35 PM), http://www.rappler.com/nation/20988-arbitration-
will-not-solve-wps-dispute-expert (discussing why the Philippines did not seek a
conciliation process to mediate its maritime dispute with China in the West Philippine
Sea); see also Ellen Tordesillas, Sue, With or Without China, MALAYA Bus. INSIGHT
(Apr. 18, 2012), http://www.malaya.com.ph/index.php/news/national/1599-sue-with-or-
without-china.
308 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Annex VI, Sect. 2, art. 21 (providing that the
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Convention, ITLOS remains an option for dispute resolution if
Israel were to voluntarily submit itself to the jurisdiction of the
Tribunal.309 ITLOS, like the ICJ, has the potential to become a
"rule interpreter" and public forum for highly politicized
international disputes,"o which increases the chance that Israel
would voluntarily submit to its jurisdiction."'
To date, only twenty cases have been submitted to the
Tribunal, none of which have involved Lebanon or Israel.3 12 The
Tribunal resolved its first border dispute in March 2012 between
Bangladesh and Myanmar.3 13 This is the first and only maritime
boundary dispute the Tribunal has heard since its creation in
1997.314
With the Tribunal's first binding decision behind it, Israel and
Lebanon stand to gain immensely from submitting their dispute to
the Tribunal. Perhaps most importantly, consistency in setting
maritime boundaries in the eastern Mediterranean is essential for
peace and full utilization of each country's resources.3 15 Israel and
Tribunal is open to States Parties to decide "all disputes and all applications submitted to
it").
309 See id. art. 20 ("The Tribunal shall be open to entities other than States
Parties ... in any case submitted pursuant to any other agreement conferring jurisdiction
on the Tribunal which is accepted by all the parties to that case.").
310 Noyes, supra note 184, at 155.
311 See infra notes 337-351 and accompanying text.
312 See List of Cases, INT'L TRIBUNAL FOR L. SEA, http://www.itlos.org/
index.php?id=35.
313 In December 2009, both Myanmar and Bangladesh consented to the jurisdiction
of the Tribunal to resolve the countries' maritime boundary in the Bay of Bengal. See
Press Release, Int'l Tribunal for L. Sea, Proceedings Instituted in the Dispute
Concerning the Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of
Bengal, U.N. Press Release ITLOS/Press 140 (Dec. 16, 2009), available at:
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/pressreleases english/PR. 140-E.pdf;
see also Press Release, Int'l Tribunal for L. Sea, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of
Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal
(Bangladesh/Myanmar), Judgment Delivered 14 March 2012, U.N. Press Release
ITLOS/Press 175 (Mar. 14, 2012), available at http://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/pressreleasesenglish/pr_175_engf.pdf [hereinafter Maritime
Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar Judgment Delivered].
314 See Maritime Boundary Between Bangladesh and Myanmar Judgment
Delivered, supra note 313. Certainly, it is reasonable to expect Lebanon and Israel to
hesitate to submit this dispute to a tribunal that has only handled one similar case,
especially given the high political and economic stakes. See supra Part II.
315 See Wahlisch, supra note I1, at 4 (discussing the region's history of conflict
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Cyprus have established maritime boundaries according to the
standards outlined in the Convention.3 16 Finally, Lebanon and
Cyprus attempted to set maritime boundaries under the
Convention in 2007.317 With extensive resources in the
Mediterranean and numerous countries laying claim to those
resources, an equitable and consistent standard for delineating
maritime boundaries is critical.
If and when Israel and Lebanon come to an agreement
regarding their maritime boundary, and the demarcation of the
EEZ specifically, the Convention's dispute resolution mechanisms
will likely have jurisdiction over any disputes arising under such
an agreement.318
iv. International Court ofJustice.
The ICJ is listed as a means to settle disputes under Article 287
of the Convention.3 19 A more detailed discussion of the viability
of the ICJ as a means of dispute resolution is discussed below. 32 0
v. Arbitration under Annexes VII or VIII
Disputes pertaining to fisheries, protection and preservation of
the marine environment, marine scientific research, and navigation
are turned over to "special" arbiters for resolution under Annex
VIII.3 2 1 All other arbitration under the Convention is governed by
Annex VII, which provides all parties to the Convention with the
option of submitting a dispute to arbitration.322 Because the
over resources and the necessity of setting the boundaries in order to extract the
resources available).
316 See Israel-Cyprus EEZ Agreement, supra note 228.
317 See W5thlisch, supra note 11, at 2 (discussing the agreement that was ratified by
Cyprus, but not by Lebanon).
318 "A court or tribunal referred to in Article 287 shall also have jurisdiction over
any dispute concerning the interpretation or application of an international agreement
related to the purposes of this Convention, which is submitted to it in accordance with
the agreement." UJNCLOS, supra note 14, Part. XV, Sect. 2, art. 288. The courts
referred to in Article 287 include ITLOS, ICJ, an arbitral tribunal under Annex VII of the
Convention, and a special arbitral tribunal under Annex ViII of the Convention. See id
art. 287.
319 Id
320 See infra notes 333-351 and accompanying text.
321 UNCLOS, supra note 14, Annex VIII, art. 1.
322 See id. Annex VII, Sect. 2, art. 287.
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dispute between Lebanon and Israel does not include any of the
issues listed under Annex VIII, it is most likely that the countries
would seek arbitration under Annex VII of the Convention.
Arbitration under Annex VII is the default dispute resolution
mechanism for cases arising under the Convention if parties do not
express a preference under Article 287(l).323 Like the conciliation
process, parties who submit to arbitration are able to appoint
arbiters authorized by the United Nations to settle the dispute.324
Since the Convention came into force in 1994, only nine cases
have been arbitrated under Annex VII of the Convention, eight of
which have been arbitrated by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
(PCA).3 25 All the parties to those eight disputes had ratified the
Convention at the time the dispute was submitted to PCA.326
Certainly, Israel could voluntarily consent to arbitration under
Part XV and Annex VII of the Convention.327 In 1998, Eritrea, a
non-party to the Convention, and Yemen, a party to the
Convention, submitted a dispute over both territorial and maritime
boundaries to PCA.3 28 The nations' territorial dispute was handled
in the first phase of arbitration; maritime boundaries were handled
in the second phase of arbitration.329 In its arbitration agreement,
Eritrea agreed to have the dispute resolved through the application
of the provisions of the Convention that were relevant to the
maritime boundary dispute, including the demarcation of its
EEZ.330 This analysis remains essentially the same even if Israel
323 See id.
324 Id. Annex VIII, art. 2.
325 Ad Hoc Arbitration Under Annex VII of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea, PERMANENT CT. AR-B., http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag
id=1288.
326 See id (listing the cases arbitrated by the PCA under Annex VII); Status of the
Convention, supra note 18 (listing the UNCLOS signatories).
327 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, arts. 286, 287 (enshrining parties' right to
arbitration).
328 Eritrea/Yemen, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?
pagid=1160.
329 Id.
330 See Maritime Delimitation (Eritrea v. Yemen), Award at 130 (Perm. Ct. Arb.
1996), http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid=l 160 (follow link to Dec. 17,
1999 decision) (stating that the Tribunal will take into account the relevant provisions of
UNCLOS).
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and Lebanon submit to international arbitration outside the context
of Annex VII of the Convention.
vi. Apply UNCLOS "Customary International Law"
Even though Israel is not a party to the Convention, Israel may
be bound to the Convention because it constitutes binding
customary international law."' Scholars widely accept that the
Convention is part of customary international law.33 2
B. International Court ofJustice
The next natural choice for dispute resolution is for Lebanon
and Israel to submit the dispute to the ICJ, the primary tribunal of
the United Nations. Both Lebanon and Israel are U.N. member
states.333 Jurisdiction by the court would be proper in three
instances: (1) where consent by both parties is expressed as a
special agreement between the two nations;334 (2) where the
dispute arises from a treaty or other international agreement; 335 or
(3) where either nation has already unilaterally declared the
jurisdiction of the court to be compulsory for resolving disputes
with other member nations.33" Given that neither country has
made such a declaration, and that Israel is not party to UNCLOS,
the most likely way for the court to exert jurisdiction over this
dispute is for the parties themselves to agree to submit the issue to
the Court.
The ICJ has long-established expertise in the resolution of
maritime disputes; its jurisprudence has concerned the resolution
331 Wilhlisch, supra note 11, at 2.
332 See supra notes 202-225 and accompanying text.
333 See Member States of the United Nations, UNITED NATIONS (July 3, 2006),
http://www.un.org/en/members/ (listing the member states of the United Nations,
including Lebanon and Israel).
334 See Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 209, art. 36(1)
(stating that the Court has jurisdiction over "all cases which the parties refer to it").
335 Article 36, paragraph I of the ICJ's jurisdictional statute provides that the ICJ's
jurisdiction includes "all matters specially provided for ... in treaties and conventions in
force." Id art. 36.
336 Id art. 36(2). For further discussion about the compulsory jurisdiction of the
Court in a maritime boundary dispute, see Charney, supra note 202, at 254-55
(discussing Denmark's unilateral declaration of ICJ's jurisdiction in its maritime
boundary dispute with Norway).
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of maritime boundary dispute more than any other subject in
international law.337 Since 2000, four maritime boundary disputes
have been submitted to it for resolution."' The ICJ was the
primary adjudicatory body for the resolution of maritime
boundaries before the establishment of the ITLOS, and has
handled far more delimitation cases than the Tribunal.3 39
While the ICJ has the expertise in resolving exactly the issue
Lebanon and Israel seek to resolve, the prospect of Israel
submitting to the ICJ's jurisdiction is doubtful at best. Israel has
been before the ICJ for various disputes, most recently for
building a wall in the West Bank.34 0 The ICJ found building the
wall was "illegal" in this recent appearance before the court.34 '
Israel's reaction to the ICJ's advisory opinion was strong and
defiant; Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu forcefully stated that
the government of Israel would "ignore" the finding of the ICJ and
continue with the construction of the wall.34 2 Also weighing
against Israel's consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction is the continuing
debate over whether the Palestinian territories will achieve the
status of a full independent member state at the United Nations.34 3
337 See generally Charney, supra note 202, at 254-55 (describing the history of
ICJ's jurisdiction over maritime boundary disputes).
338 Since 1947, twelve maritime disputes have been submitted to the ICJ. List of
Contentious Cases, INT'L CT. J., http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/index.php?pl=3&p2=3.
The following maritime disputes have been submitted to the I.C.J. since 2000: Nicaragua
v. Colombia (2001), El Salvador v. Honduras (2002), Romania v. Ukraine (2004), and
Peru v. Chile (2008). Id.
339 Noyes, supra note 184, at 111.
340 See U.N. Secretary-General, Illegal Israeli Actions in Occupied East Jerusalem
and the Rest of the Occupied Palestinian Territory: Report of the Secretary-General, 2,
U.N. Doc. A/ES-10/248 (Nov. 24, 2003), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/
files/13 1/1497.pdf.
341 Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, 142 (July 9, 2004), available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/1671.pdf.
342 "Because the court's decision makes a mockery of Israel's right to defend itself,
the government of Israel will ignore it." Benjamin Netanyahu, Why Israel Needs a
Fence, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/07/13/opinion/why-
israel-needs-a-fence.html.
343 In November 2012, the U.N. General Assembly voted to recognize Palestine as
a nonmember observer state. Ethan Bronner & Christine Hauser, U.N. Assembly, In
Blow to the U.S., Elevates the Status of Palestine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/30/world/middleeast/Palestinian-Authority-United-
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Israel and the United States have sharply opposed the recognition
of Palestine as a member or observer state at the United Nations.344
If Palestine were to become a full member state, Palestine could
use the tools of the United Nations, including the ICJ, to hold
Israel accountable for alleged human rights violations in the
occupied Palestinian territories.34 5
If Israel were to consent to the ICJ's jurisdiction, UNCLOS
likely would be controlling law. The ICJ applies "international
custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted by law,"346 and,
as discussed above, the Convention is widely accepted as
customary international law.34 7 Under Article 59 of the
Convention, "the conflict should be resolved on the basis of equity
and in the light of all the relevant circumstances" taking into
account the "importance of the interests involved" for each of the
parties and the "international community as a whole."3 48  It is
likely that Israel's and Lebanon's agreements with Cyprus and
other established maritime boundaries delimited under the
Convention in the eastern Mediterranean would be significant
considerations of the Court as it marks the countries' respective
Nations-Israel.html?pagewanted=all&_r-0. The United States and Israel voted against
the resolution. Ethan Bronner & Christine Hauser, UN. Assembly, In Blow to the US.,
Elevates the Status of Palestine, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 29, 2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/1l/30/world/middleeast/Palestinian-Authority-United-
Nations-Israel.html?pagewanted=all& r-0; Robert McMahon & Jonathan Masters,
Palestinian Statehood at the UN, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Nov. 30, 2012),
http://www.cfr.org/
palestinian-authority/palestinian-statehood-un/p25954.
344 See Bronner & Hauser, supra note 343.
345 In December 2000, Israel signed the Statute of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) after years of resistance. See Daniel A. Blumenthal, The Politics of Justice: Why
Israel Signed the International Criminal Court Statute and What the Signature Means,
30 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L 593, 596 (2001-02). Israel's primary concern with the ICC
Statute was that Israel could be prosecuted for war crimes at the ICC for building
settlements in the West Bank, Gaza, and the Golan Heights area. See id In an effort to
make progress in peace negotiations with Palestinian negotiators, Israel signed the
Statute in 2000. See id. If Israel were able to put its concerns with the ICC aside for the
sake of making progress in Israel-Palestinian peace negotiations, perhaps it would be
able to set aside its general distaste for the ICJ to seek a peaceful resolution of this
boundary dispute. Cf id.
346 Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 209, art. 38(1).
347 See supra notes 202-225 and accompanying text.
348 UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part V, art. 59.
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maritime boundaries.
Given the ICJ's extensive experience in maritime delimitation
and the binding nature of the Convention as customary
international law, the ICJ is a viable option for resolving this
dispute.34 9 If Israel is willing to submit to the Court's jurisdiction
and Hezbollah does not oppose such a move, the ICJ's mediation
of the border dispute could lead to a peaceful resolution of
Lebanon's and Israel's maritime borders."o If the Israeli
government or Hezbollah opposes the Court's mediation, Israel
and Lebanon may have the option turn to the United Nations to
mediate the conflict.351
C. Mediation by the United Nations
The United Nations Interim Force (UNIFIL) in Lebanon has
played a significant role in securing the territorial border in
Lebanon and ensuring relative peace between the two nations
along their shared territorial border, and remains a peacekeeping
presence in southern Lebanon today.35 2 Under U.N. Security
Council Resolutions 425 and 426, UNIFIL is tasked with
monitoring the withdrawal of Israel from southern Lebanon and
restoring peace and security along the southern border of
Lebanon. 5 1 In 2006, the scope of UNIFIL's mandate was
expanded to include the following: "monitor the cessation of
hostilities"; support the Lebanese Armed Forces as they secure the
southern border; ensure humanitarian access along the Blue Line,
ensure peace and security between the Blue Line and the Litani
349 See Wihlisch, supra note 11, at 2 (stating that the Convention is binding); see
generally Charney, supra note 202 (discussing ICJ's capacity to settle maritime
boundary disputes).
350 See supra note 345 and accompanying text.
351 See Asarta Proposed UNIFIL Mediatory Role in Demarcating Maritime Border
Between Lebanon and Israel, NAHARNET (July 21, 2011), http://www.naharnet.com/
stories/en/10847-asarta-proposed-unifil-mediatory-role-in-demarcating-maritime-border-
between-lebanon-and-israel (reporting that UNIFIL has suggested that it act as mediator
in Israel-Lebanon dispute) [hereinafter UNIFIL Mediatory Role].
352 See UNIFIL Marks International Day of Peace, U.N. INTERIM FORCE IN
LEBANON (Sept. 20, 2013), http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=l 1552&ctl=
Details&mid= 15105&ltemlD=22735&language=en-US (discussing the ongoing
presence of UNIFIL in southern Lebanon).
353 UNIFIL Mandate, supra note 74.
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River; and secure the border of southern Lebanon.35 4 UNIFIL also
includes a Maritime Task Force (MTF), which monitors the
Lebanese coastline; however, the MTF is not explicitly tasked
with protecting Lebanon's maritime boundaries.35 5
UNIFIL has offered to mediate the maritime boundary dispute
between Israel and Lebanon, as an extension of their peacekeeping
and monitoring duties associated with the countries' territorial
border.35 6  In July 2011, UNIFIL's then-Commander Major
General Alberto Asarta expressed interest in UNIFIL acting as the
mediator between the countries as they come to an agreement over
the maritime border.357 Israel may be more amenable to this
arrangement than to mediation by other international bodies; Israel
has been largely cooperative with UNIFIL's efforts along its
border with Lebanon, despite its concerns with UNIFIL's
communications with Hezbollah.358 UNIFIL is also a known
quantity-the Force has been a presence in the region and along
the border between Israel and Lebanon since 1978."'
Hezbollah's relationship with UNIFIL has been largely
positive, so the organization may be less likely to object to
UNIFIL's mediation efforts in principle.3 60 On the other hand, if
354 Id
355 See UNIFIL Maritime Task Force, U.N. INTERIM FORCE IN LEBANON,
http://unifil.unmissions.org/Default.aspx?tabid=l 1584&language=en-US.
356 Brooke Anderson, UN. Looking Into Helping Lebanon Draw Maritime
Security Line, DAILY STAR (July 21, 2011, 6:31 PM), http://www.dailystar.com.lb/
News/Middle-East/201 1/Jul-21/UN-to-assist-Lebanon-draw-maritime-security-
line.ashx#axzz2gbgpExHq; UNIFIL Mediatory Role, supra note 351.
357 Anderson, supra note 356; UNIFIL Mediatory Role, supra note 351.
358 See e.g., Aluf Benn, Israel Accuses UN of Collaborating with Hezbollah,
HAARETZ (Sept. 11, 2005, 12:00 AM), http://www.haaretz.com/news/israel-accuses-un-
of-collaborating-with-hezbollah-1.169520. Cf Linda Butler, "Mr. UNIFIL" Reflects on
a Quarter Century of Peacekeeping in South Lebanon: An Interview with Timur Goksel,
36 J. PALESTINE STUD., no. 3, Spring 2007, at 50, 62 ("The Israelis were always deeply
distrustful of the UN and mostly they didn't distinguish between the organization and the
individuals connected with it .... Israel's proxy, the SLA, was a big problem. The UN
forces hated the way the Israelis used these guys against the UN and the local
population.").
359 See UNIFIL Mandate, supra note 74 (noting that UNIFIL has been in the
region since 1978).
360 See Elron, supra note 74 (describing the positive relationship between
Hezbollah and UNIFIL). Sheik Hassan Nasrallah appointed an official Hezbollah liaison
for UNIFIL after he took over leadership of the organization in the 1990s. See Butler,
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Hezbollah views a possible outcome from UNIFIL's mediation as
unfavorable, either because the predicted outcome does not benefit
Lebanon or because the mediation legitimizes Israel, Hezbollah
may object to UNIFIL's role as a mediator.
Potentially complicating this dispute resolution option are two
primary concerns. First, setting the maritime border is not
specifically included in UNIFIL's existing mandate, nor is it a
duty entrusted to UNIFIL by U.N. Resolution 1701.361 The U.N.
Security Council could vote to expand the scope of the mandate of
UNIFIL to include mediation of this maritime border dispute, just
as they have amended the Force's mandate in the past.362 While
neither Israel nor Lebanon are current members of the U.N.
Security Council,3 63 it is reasonable to expect the United States, as
a permanent member, to support such a resolution if Israel is also
in favor of the arrangement.' After all, the energy company
currently exploring and developing the reserves is U.S.-based
Nobel Energy.365
Second, it is unclear what procedures and standards UNIFIL
would employ to mediate the conflict and establish a maritime
boundary since the Force has never established such a border in
the past.366 UNIFIL likely would turn to UNCLOS as controlling
law in determining the border, given that the Convention is widely
accepted as customary international law and that the United
supra note 358, at 72 (describing the relationship between Hezbollah and UNIFIL).
Further supporting a civil relationship with UNIFIL is Hezbollah's transition to a
military branch made up primarily of local men, most of whom grew up in the presence
of UNIFIL. See id.
361 See UNIFIL Mandate, supra note 74.
362 U.N. Security Council Resolution 1701 expanded the mandate of Resolutions
425 and 426, which established UNIFIL and its original mandate, respectively. See id.
363 Current Members, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, http://www.un.org/en/sc/
members/.
364 See James Stocker, No EEZ Solution: The Politics of Oil and Gas in the
Eastern Mediterranean, 66 MIDDLE E. J., no. 4, Autumn 2012, at 579, 596 (2012)
(discussing the United States' interest in resolving the dispute amicably).
365 See Eastern Mediterranean, NOBLE ENERGY, http://www.nobleenergyinc.com/
operations/intemational/eastern-mediterranean-128.html. While this U.S. company has
made significant investments in the eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. government is
unlikely to support any proposal not supported by the Israeli government. See id
366 See Anderson, supra note 356 (stating that establishing such a border is outside
the scope of UNIFIL's mission).
978 Vol. XXXIX
NATURAL GAS AND THE LEVANT BASIN
Nations endorses the Convention as the controlling law of the
sea.36 7 If the Convention were adopted as UNIFIL's standard, one
would expect the outcome of the delimitation of the maritime
boundary to mirror the outcome under the Convention's dispute
resolution options and adjudication by the ICJ.3 68
D. International Arbitration
International arbitration is yet another viable alternative to
resolve the maritime boundary dispute between Lebanon and
Israel.3 69 The PCA, discussed in the context of arbitration under
the Convention, has mediated numerous maritime boundary
disputes and has at least two pending cases regarding the
delimitation of maritime boundaries.370 There is little, if any,
material difference between international arbitration under the
Convention and outside the context of the Convention as long as
Israel remains a non-party to the Convention.37 ' Because Israel is
not a party to the Convention, the country may be willing to
voluntarily submit to arbitration outside the requirements of
Annex VII of the Convention.3 72 Additionally, the PCA is
independent from the United Nations, and may not prompt the
same Israeli concern that mediation by the United Nations or ICJ
might in light of the ongoing debate over the status of the
Palestinian territories at the United Nations.373
367 See supra notes 202-225 and accompanying text.
368 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part XV, Sect. 2, arts. 281-87 (stating the dispute
resolution procedures and naming the ICJ as one of the potential venues).
369 Wahlisch, supra note 11, at 4.
370 Arbitration between the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Slovenia, as
well as between Bangladesh and India is currently pending before the Permanent Court
of Arbitration. See Pending Cases, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-cpa.org/
showpage.asp?pagid=1 145.
371 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part I, art. 1 (defining "States Parties" as States
that have signed the treaty); id. Part XV, Sect. 2, art. 287 (limiting Part XV's arbitration
provisions to "State Parties").
372 See Newman, supra note 291 (discussing Israel's need to approach
international authorities to resolve the dispute, but the desire to do so outside of the
UNCLOS).
373 See About Us, PERMANENT CT. ARB., http://www.pca-
cpa.org/showpage.asp?pagid=1027 (describing the PCA as an independent
intergovernmental organization); Bronner & Hauser, supra note 343 (discussing the
elevated status of Palestine at the United Nations, and what it means for Israel and
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V. Conclusion
Lebanon and Israel have a number of viable options for
resolving their existing maritime border dispute using existing
international law frameworks: conciliation, submission to the
ITLOS, submission to the ICJ, and arbitration under the
UNCLOS; or submission to the ICJ separate and apart from the
Convention; mediation by the United Nations; and international
arbitration.374
The preceding discussion reveals that Lebanon, while a party
to multiple international agreements and the UNCLOS, has a
fractious and unstable government.3 75 As a result, Hezbollah holds
an effective veto on any action that the Lebanese government may
take in response to international action on the maritime
boundary.37 6 Israel, on the other hand, is a more established,
stable, and advanced democracy, but remains reticent to enter into
international agreements or submit itself to international
tribunals.3 77  Additionally, the current right-wing government of
Israel, led by Benjamin Netanyahu, has aggressively pursued gas
exploration in the areas that the country has claimed as its
territorial sea and EEZ.
Recently, both Cyprus and the United States have indicated
their willingness to participate in the mediation between Lebanon
and Israel.3 79  Both countries stand to benefit if a peaceful
resolution is found to this dispute.380 For its part, Cyprus is eager
Palestine).
374 See UNCLOS, supra note 14, Part XV, Sect. 2, arts. 281-87 (discussing
conciliation, the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, the ICJ, and arbitration
under the UNCLOS); Statute of the International Court of Justice, supra note 209, art.
36(1) (discussing submission to ICJ separate from the Convention); Wthlisch, supra
note 11, at 4 (discussing mediation by the United Nations and arbitration).
375 See supra notes 82-101 and accompanying text.
376 See id.
377 See Michael Oren, Israel's Resilient Democracy, FOREIGN POL'Y (Apr. 5,
2012), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2012/04/05/IsraelIs_a_Democracy
(discussing the relative stability of Israel's democracy); Status of the Convention, supra
note 18 (showing Israel's reluctance to sign international agreements).
378 See supra notes 102-124 and accompanying text.
379 Simon Henderson, Cyprus Helping with Israel-Lebanon Dispute, WASH. INST.
(Jan. 10, 2013), http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/cyprus-
helping-with-israel-lebanon-maritime-dispute.
380 See Stocker, supra note 364, at 596 (describing the United States' interest in a
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to explore and develop its portion of the Levant Basin.' With
this in mind, the director of the Cypriot Department of Energy has
offered to do "as much as it can" to mediate between the two
countries.382 If the dispute between Israel and Lebanon can be
peacefully resolved, Cyprus can fully utilize its portion of the
reserves. 3 83  The United States has also extended an offer to
mediate between the countries, and has proposed a boundary
between Israel's and Lebanon's EEZ.3 84 Details of the proposal by
the United States are unavailable as of this writing, but such a
proposal likely will inform any final agreement between Israel and
Lebanon.38 ' Little progress in resolving the maritime boundary
has been made since these entreaties by the United States and
Cyprus. 38 6 The resolution of this maritime boundary dispute may
not be resolved quickly; after all, the demarcation of the Blue Line
between Israel and Lebanon took over ten years to negotiate.
Whether the dispute will escalate into military conflict is
unclear. Certainly the long history of military conflict between the
countries does not bode well for a peaceful resolution.8 On the
other hand, the economies of both countries are poised to benefit
tremendously from the exploration of natural gas in the Levant
peaceful agreement); Michael Shmulovich, Cyprus Offers to Mediate Between Israel and
Lebanon over Offshore Gas Dispute, TIMES OF ISRAEL (Dec. 3, 2012, 8:53 PM),
http://www.timesofisrael.com/cyprus-offers-to-mediate-between-israel-and-lebanon-
over-offshore-gas-dispute/ (describing Cyprus's economic interest in settling the dispute
amicably).
381 See Stocker, supra note 364, at 596; Shmulovich, supra note 380.
382 See Stocker, supra note 364, at 596; Shmulovich, supra note 380.
383 See Stocker, supra note 364, at 596; Shmulovich, supra note 380.
384 Nicholas Blanford, Lebanon, Israel Take Step Toward Claiming Big Oil, Gas
Deposits, CHRISTIAN SC. MONITOR (Dec. 19, 2012), http://www.csmonitor.com/
World/Middle-East/2012/1219/Lebanon-Israel-take-step-toward-claiming-big-oil-gas-
deposits. See US Mediating, supra note 273 (describing the United States' mediation
efforts).
385 See Blanford, supra note 384 (reporting that the data regarding the resources
available informed the United States' proposal).
386 Seven months after the U.S. proposal and the efforts made by Cyprus, little if
any progress has been made. See U.S. Willing to Help Solve Lebanese-Israeli Maritime
Border Conflict, NAT. GAS EUR. (July 22, 2013, 12:00 AM),
http://www.naturalgaseurope.com/lebanese-israeli-maritime-border-conflict (stating that
the dispute is ongoing).
387 Wahlisch, supra note 11, at 4.
388 See supra Part II(A).
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Basin.38 9 Both Lebanon and Israel have been forced to depend on
unreliable sources of oil and natural gas to meet their energy
demands.39 0 As war continues in Syria, threatening Lebanon's
energy supply, Israel also must fill the void left by its failed
contract with Egypt: both countries are in need of a more reliable
and consistent supply of oil and natural gas.3 9'
Existing international law frameworks provide workable
options to resolve of this border dispute. It is unlikely that the
various tribunals discussed above will come to significantly
different outcomes because of the applicability of the Convention
as customary international law.392 Given the UNCLOS's status as
customary international law and the fact that the ITLOS, the ICJ,
and international arbiters likely will apply the Convention as
customary international law in resolving the dispute, the countries
have little to gain in delaying the decision over how to resolve this
conflict.
389 Wahlisch, supra note 11, at 2.
390 See Whlisch, supra note 11, at 2 (describing Israel's energy sources);
Citigroup: Production of Gas Will Eventually Lead Lebanon to Energy Independence,
IFPINFO.COM (Oct. 2, 2012), http://www.ifpinfo.com/ifpinfo-news.php?news-id=l 152
(discussing Lebanon's energy costs).
391 See Wahlisch, supra note 11, at 4 (discussing the need for both countries to
secure resources due to regional instability).
392 See supra Part III(B).
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